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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper was to determine the
effects that col on is at io n had firstly, on nationalist
sentiments of independence in Africa, secondly, on
efforts toward achieving continental unity and thirdly,
on the formation of the Organi zati on of Af ri ca n Unity
wh ich was ultimately founded on thje 25th of May, 1963 ,
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
An examination was first made of the development of
the concept of Af r i c a n Unity, from Pan-Afr icanis t theory
in the early 19th century, to nationalist organizations
aggitating for independence and unity, finally c u l m i n a 
ting in the Summit of Heads of States in Addis Ababa.
A review was also made of the period from to
1958-1963 when efforts towards achieving Afri ca n unity
we re taken by important A f ri ca n countries and which was
w h e n deep divisions and discord emerged as the legacy of
the colonial era.
An analysis was then made of the
nature and differe nce s of the two major metho ds of
colonial a d m i n s i t r a t i o n ; the Direct Method used by the
French and the Indirect Met ho d adopted by the British,
and their resultant effects on the dev elopment of the
indigenous political leadership.
There is no doubt that the dynamics that developed
out of the relat ions hip s betwee n the colonial power and
the colony had lasting, influences on the political
phi los ophy and outlook of A f r i c a ’s leadership.
In
French Africa, where citizens of the colonies were
the ror etical ly accepted as citizens of France, the
emphasis was on achie ving rights they felt were being
denied to them as Fr enc h citizens.
In Br iti sh Africa,
there was never any ques tio n that the ult im ate goal was
for total independence from Britain, as they were never
consid ere d British subjects.
As a result of these fundemental differences, the
states were split in their attitudes towards Afric an
Unity.
The An glopho ne countries espoused total unity,
and in some cases a single central government for the
c o n t inent ”w hil e the Fra ncophone countries favored at
best, a loose association of cooperation.
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COLONIALISM AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
The Effect of the Colonial Experience
on African Attempts to Unite

INTRODUCTION

The study of political science,
international relations,

government and

eve ntually leads to the

question of w h et he r actions

in the international realm

are enacted by systems of states,

by states themselves

or by the m en who create these states.
wh ich approach of analysis

The debate as to

is correct has gone on for a

long time and pro bably will continue on for even longer,
because there are never any absolute truths,

and even

loose gen eralities are faced with numerous co nt ra di c
tions .
Nevertheless,

a choice must be ma de as to how one

wi ll examine such a question; whe th er at the community
level,

the state level or the individual level.

In most

cases it is a combination of two or three of the above
in vary ing degrees.

This is the case whe n one looks at

the po litical hist ory of Africa,

par tic ul ar ly when it

comes to Af r i c a n Unity.
Two pr evailin g factors appear to be the colonial
ba ckgrou nd and the charismatic personalities of in div i
dual leaders.

The early hist ory of independent p o s t 

colonial Africa,

has been do minated by names like

Kenyat ta of Kenya, Nkrumah of Ghana,

Houphouet- Boig ny of

the Ivory Coast, Leop ol d Senghor of Senegal,

Sekou Toure

of Guinea or Nasser of Egypt.

More often than not,

these men were not only larger than their governments,
they were their governments, making key decisions
unilat er al ly and par ticu la rl y in foreign policy,
de termi nin g which w a y their nations went..
The link betwe en the perspectives of the individual
leaders of Africa,
primary;
policy,

and their colonial background,

if these me n were the actors,

is

carrying out

the colonial experience was the backd ro p against

w hi ch these m e n were formed.

It was the most influential

of factors affecting the environment into wh ic h they
wo uld come after independence,

and wi th in whi ch they

w ou ld act.
A n exa mination into this relationship would appear
i
to be recover ing wel l trodden ground, and thus at best
be a reminder of certain theories,
redundant.

and at worst be

However, whe n looking at the same rel a

tionship as an influential factor in the formation of
nationalist sentiment w i th in the international realm,

it

no longer seems quite as redundant.
The Concise Oxf or d dictio nar y defines nationalism
as ’’patriotic

feeling,

or principles,

of national independence".

or efforts;

policy

This paper focuses on the

latter half of that definition,

i.e., the pursuit of

policies of national independence.

The significance of

the rela tionship becomes quite important, wh en one

3.

considers the role of nationa lis m in world affairs.
Since the end of World War II,

the organisation and

arranging of the international community has been in fl u
enced by two fundemental trends.

Firstly,

the

co nso li da tion of the nation state as the principle actor
in international affairs,

secondly,

the efforts towards

creat ing supranational organisations

to create order and

regulate the international community.
The fact that both these trends went on at the same
time does not mean that*they were condusive to each
other..

In fact the pursuit of one implies the c o m p r o m i 

sing of the other.

To some extent the peace and stabi 

lity of the worl d depends on w hi ch trend is dominant;
that is the question of w h o will actually keep wo rld
order;

the restraint of individual nations,

or some

hig he r organisations.
The focus of this paper then,

is on the influence

that colonial backgrou nds had on the development of
n a ti on alis m |in Africa.
perce pti ons on,

I'n particular,

1) Pan-A fri can Unity,

Af r i c a n Unity and 3)

how it affected
2) Regional

individual state independence,

by

looking at the O rg ani sati on of Af ric an Unity whi ch was
founded on M a y 25,

19 63 in Addis Ababa.

Whil e I accept the fact that there were other
equally important factors affecting the founding of this
body,

I will confine myself to the relationship between

the colonial backgrounds,

and the na tio na lis m espoused

by the elite group of Afri can leadership at the time.
I will be concentr at ing m ain ly on the actual found
ing of the OAU rather than looking at its subsequent
history which was to a large extent pr ede ter mined by the
O A U ’s Charter,

and the perception of its scope and

authority.
I will also be looking at the history prior to the
conference concern ing Afr ic an Unity,

as well as looking

back at the colonial systems and their effect on the
subsequent leadership of Africa.
The ideas of freedom and self-dete rmi nation in
A fric a have long been associated wit h the idea of
P a n - Af ri ca nism and Africa n Unity.
ideas seem condusive to each other,

Not only do the two
and supportive,

they

developed along side each other and thoughts of the
pursuit of freedom and self-determinatio n are actually
all embraced w i th in the theory of Pan-Africanism.

All

were geared towards helping achieve eventual indepen
dence for Af r i c a and equality for people of African
descent wi th the rest of the world.

Therefore,

propose to go through the history of both,
because as will become evident,
much intertwined.

I

together,

their history is very

CHAPT ER ONE

Early P a n - Af rica ni sm
The seeds of P a n- Af ri canis m and A f ri ca n unity,
first sprouted in the Car ib be an and the United States.
A precise defini tio n o f .Pan- Afric an is m does not and
probably will never exist because it is a search for
utopia at one extreme and for simple equality and
dignity on the other,

involving m a ny different goals.

Some m aj or components and themes include the idea of:
"Africa as the homel an d of Africans and
persons of A f r i c a n origin,

solidarity among

people of A fr i c a n descent,

belief in a

distinct A f ric an personality,
of Africa' s past,

r eh ab ilit ati on

pride in Africa's culture

and the hope for a united glorious

future

for Africa"^

Actions and und ert akings wit h these ideals in mind
are recorded as far back as the early 19th century,

and

the attempt to resettle Am er ican Negroes in the U. S.
colony of Sierra Leone.

There were movement s to abolish

slavery with many groups and activities' aimed at trying
to achieve equality.
in detail,

Withou t becoming too bogged down

we can ackn owl edge the attempt to reorient

people of Af rican descent in the New Wo rld back to
Africa not only physicall y but spiritually and mentall y

6.

as well.

This coincided with the attempt to re-evaluate

the Negroes as a race and reject the negative s t ereo
types attributed to them,

the main one being the need

for European rule to bring order and progress to Africa.
Aspects of nation al ist actions also took place in
A f r i c a itself.

Na ti on al churches sprang up and split

from the Europea n churches,
head of these churches

placing native chiefs at the

just as the English mona rch was

the head of the Church of England.
This occurred in the colonies of Nigeria,

the

Ca m er ou n and B a s u to la nd in the late 1880's and the early
1890 1s.2
All these activites were going on but had not been
unified under an all embracing,
such as Pan Africanism.

overri din g phi los ophy

This however changed w it h the

em ergence of men who could articulate these various
actions ,as all being aspects of the pursuit of a common
g o a l , and who wo uld enc ourage and inspire these actions
to continue with this larger goal in mind.
Among these early P an -African theorists were men
like J. Afr icanus Horton,
Blyden.

All were,

as academicians,

Rev.

James Johnson and Edward

apart from their successful careers

prolific and powerful writers who

shaped the thinking of future black leaders.
most famous work was ent it led
and Peoples,

Horton's

"West African Countries

British and Native.

With The Requirements

N e c e ssary for Establ ishing that Self Government Re c o m 
me nde d by the Committee of the House of Commons,
and A V in di catio n of the Af ric an Race"
fellow Sierra Leonian,

Rev.

3

1865,

, both he and

Johnson advocated the.

development of independent Afri ca n states,

and in

Johnson's case,

in order to

a separate Afri can Church,

develop the latent talents and skills which'the Negro
race po sse sse d as abundan tly as any other,
they had a right and a duty to use.
men stands Edward Blyden,

and which

A lo ngside these two

from Nigeria, whose real

co ntr ibutio n was his ability to express ideas which
en compa sse d Pan-Afri canis t sentiment and inspired many.
His tracts such as "Hope for Africa",
A n cie nt History"

"The Negro in

as well as his addresses on "Study and

Race" were brill iant rejections of 19th century racist
views by revelling in the glories of ancient Africa and
in Af ric a' s place in the future as a united power,
the benefit of Afri ca n people.
Af r i c a n states,

saying,

for

Blyden called for

"So long as we live simply by

their sufferance, we must expect to be subject to their
caprices".

It was Blyden's opinion that a strong,

united Afr ic a would also benefit African s of the d i a s 
pora by helping them become citizens of the nations
thay they lived in by giving them a focal point of pride
and b e l o n g i n g . 4
There are of course other names that should be

mentioned.
them.

Benito Sylvain of Haiti being just one of

However,

it is not the purpose of this chapter to

prese nt an exhaustive account of Pan-A fri canist history,
it is rather to present a general and basic background
of the evolution of Pan-Af ric anist Thought,

so that

later analysis will not take place in a vacuum.
These men that I have mentio ned were important in
that t h e y 1 represen ted a period when ideas were being
developed,

discussed,

and circulated resulting in a

synthesis whic h was Pan-Africanist.

This

synthesis

devel ope d in stages, where not only was the body of
thought first unifi ed and made coherent,

but more

importan tly the thinkers and articulators,
and discussed unifi ed action.

came together

This was done through a

series of Pan -A fric an Conferences.

The Pan Af r i c a n C o n f e r e n c e s : Phase I
The first of these conferences took place in
Chicago in 1893.
tives

A mo ng those present were r e p r esent a

from Egypt, Libe ria and Sierra Leone,

course,

from the United States.

Edward Blyden,

and of

Speeches were made

Booker T. Was hi ng to n and Rev.

Johnson.

There was also a con ference in Georgia in 1895.

In

1897, Henry Sylvester Williams,
dad,

a bar rister from Trini5
launched the Af r i c a n Association.
The common

themes running through all these activities was the

re jec tion of the negative attributes
Negro race,

imposed upon the

as well as a call to both Africans and the

European powers that it was time for Africa to develop
and take her place in the world of civilised men as
equals and equally importantly a call to closer contact
between fellow Africans

in order to achieve these

g o ai
l s .6
The Second Pa n-Afric an Conference which took place
in W e st mi niste r in 1900 cr yst allized the attempts to
achieve these goals.

There were representatives

from

the C a r i b b e a n ,, from the Uni te d States, most importantly
W. E. B. DuBois and from the colonies in Afr ic a as well
The outcome of the conference resulted in the adoption
of a Pan-A fr ic an or ga nis ation which was to replace the
f

A fr i c a n Association.
1.

It was based on five principles:

To secure civil and pol itical rights for Africans
and their de scendents throughout the world.

2.

To encourage

friendly relations between the C a u c a 

sian and Afr ican races.
3.

To encourage the A f ri can peoples everywhere

in

ed ucational industrial and comercial enterprise.
4.

To approach Governments and influence legislation
over the black races,

5.

and

To ameliorate the conditio n of the oppressed Negros
in Africa, America,

the British Empire and other

parts of the world.

A secretariat was set up in London with various
branches around the wo rld to coordinate activities and

10.

deal with local i s s u e s .

Also the Assoc iai ton was to

me et every two y e a r s .^
The next mee ti ng wh ich was held in the United
States

saw a pr eview of the later pr e-emine nce of W. E.

B. DuBois. in Pan-Af ric anist thought.
pr ese nted wh ic h was

In a paper he

later adopted by the gathering,

he

stated that the proble m of the twentieth century was the
pr obl em of the color line.

Aside from the paper's

rej ection of racial slurs and stereotypes,

the paper was

important for its call for France and Britain to grant
independence to their colonies,

and for the United
g
States to end the op pressio n of her Negros.
Wh ile the conference was hi sto rica ll y significant
and important to the later P an -A fr ic an movement,

the

achieve men ts of the A s s o c i a t i o n were limited due to the
lack of funds and it faded into obs curity after 1902.

G a r v eyism
The next ma j o r develo pment in the Pan-Afr ica nist
co ncept of A f r i c a n Uni ty and se lf -determina tio n was the
emergence of Marcus Garvey.
Born in Jamaica in 1887, he had a long and varied
education,

and an equally interesting career which began

as a printer,

before dev eloping into an editor.

Ga rve y would later mo bil ize
people in the United States,

Mar cus

large numbers of the Negro
and tempo rar ily place him-

self at the head of the moveme nt to liberate the Negro,
people from their physical,

mental and spiritual

oppression.
Much of Garvey's
spectacular mann er

fame came from the flamboyant and

in which he went about rehabilitia-

ting the image of Africa and of ■the black race.
In 1916, Garvey came to Harlem to try and
capitalise on the noble sounding principles and
doctrines wh ic h were echoing 'around the United States,
particul arl y Wo o d r o w Wilson's Four Points which called
for de mocracy and self-de ter mination in a world where
pedce and coop er atio n were to be striven for.

Garvey's

fiery per sonal it y and ability to communicate and inspire
crowds,

combined with the right atmosphere led to the

founding of the Universal Negro Imporvement Associaion
in N e w York, whi ch led to the pu bli ca tio n of the NEGRO
WORLD a newsp aper w hi ch lasted until 1953.
Garvey's mes si an ic vis ion of a future Af ri can
Empire spawned a wave of businesses,

groups and

publications all supporting his call for Africans to do
for themselves;
Shipping line,
Af ric an people.

he himself launched the Black Star
calling for Africans to ship goods for
While Garvey's actions were limited to

the United States,

the knowledge of his action and his

name spread all over Africa,

and his calls of "Back to

Africa" and "Africa for Africans" were to become

12 .

rallying cries for the Pan-Africani sts
nationalist move ments as well.
Garvey's success
lack of organisation,

and for the

9

soon faltered,

pr ima rily due to

and also because of Garvey's

clashes with other Negro leaders, who rid iculed his
excessive pomp, pa gentry and other eccentricities.
Garvey's success was not so muc h in his intellectualization,

or in his c on tri buti on to Pan -Afric ani st

thought,

but rather in his ability to gather and

gener ate

support among the masses of black people who

were unmoved by reading bri lliant speeches and papers.
Garvey was first to demostrate the possibility of taking
pos it ive action, wit h the as yet unmobilised black
people.

His fall from grace came rapidly.

After

investigations about mism an a g e m e n t of funds for the
Black Star Line, Gar ve y was deported back to Jamaica,
and never regained the influence or potential
influence that he once had.

His fall however,

for
cannot

over sh ad ow his co nt ribution to the creation of a feeling
of sol idarity among Afr ic ans and people of African
descent.
At the same time,
his wake,

several orgnizations

sprang up in

capitalizing on the new burst of ent husias m he

had generated:

the Union of Students of Af ric an Descent

and the A f r i c a n Progress Union, both based in London,
we r e two e x a m p l e s . ^

The Pan A f r ic an Congress:

Phase II

Dev elo ping alongside Gar ve yi sm during the same
p er io d was the work of W. -E . B. DuBois.
leading spokesman and civil activist,
b r i l li an t scholar.
the international

DuBois was a

as well as a

His later career was devoted more to
struggle for equal rights

of A f r i c a n descent,

for people

leading to his becoming a

p r e-e mi ne nt Pan-Af ri can theorist.
DuBois convened a series of Pan -African meetings
b e twe en 1919-1927,

calling for progress for peoples of

A f r i c a n descent and an end to disc ri mi nati on and o p p r e s 
sion not only in the United States but in colonial
A fr ic a as well.

His London Pan- Afr ican conference of

19 21 was mor e radical in tone than any of the previous
P an-A fr ic an gatherings.

The ma ni fest o that was adopted

by the conference cri tic ised the colonial systems and
the conditions of relations betw een the white and
coloured races.

It also pleaded for the respect of the

sovreignity of Haiti, Aby ss in ia
Liberia.

(now Ethiopia)

and

The m a n i f e s t o also challe nge d the rest of the

w or ld to participat e

in the buildi ng of a great new

society wh ere all w o ul d be equals.

11

There were of course other forces wo r ki ng towards
the Pan-Af ric an ideals.

In August of 1925 the West

Af ri ca n Students Union was launched in London.
brief,

In

its principles were "to establish a hostel for

14.

the growing number of Afric an students

studying abroad,

to foster the spirit of national con sciousness and
racial pride among all African people,

to serve as a

center for information on Af r i c a n history customs and
institutions,

to act as a center for research on all

subjects per tain in g to Africa and its development."

12

The significance of this or ga nis ati on was that it
pr ovi ded a recogn ize d and accepted forum for discussion.
It also became a m e et in g point for the ever increasing
number of A f rica n activists.
WASU was influential

Its m o nt hl y publication,

in help ing spread ideas of na t i o n a 

lism and Af r i c a n Unity.

The influence it would have

later was ref le ct ed by its membership:

Kwame Nkrumah of

the Gold Coast, Jomo Key nat ta of Kenya and Nnamdi
A zi kiwe of Nigeria,
players

all of who m were to become major

in the drama of na tionalism and independence.

To review at this point what it is we have been
de aling wi th is to give a sense of all the different
or ganisations and person ali ties involved in the quest
for the rehab ili tation of the Negro race, both in and
out of Africa.

Rehabilitation,

pride in ones colour,
race, Africa.
movement,

in terms of creating

ones race and the source of that

There were therefore ma ny aspects of this

all with the hope that eventual ly Africa and

her people would be treated as equal participants

in

w o r l d affairs and as equals based on the pot ential of
her people.
The question of independence and self-rule was
inevitable and in the quest for a bright future
Africa,

for

the need for solidarity amongst all people of

A f r i c a n descent,

developed into solidarity between

future Af ric an states as we'll.
The Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the start of
W or ld War II were the final ingredients in the
blo ssom in g of the mov eme nt s

for independence and

indirectly, Afr ic an Unity.

The ideals for w hi ch the

Wo rld wa r was being fought included among ma n y o t h e r s ,
the right to freedom for all peoples.

The obvious

contra dic tions betw een what the allies were saying and
wh at they were practicing,
ignore.

became more difficul t to

Especi all y in vi ew of the fact that many

A f ric an soldiers actuall y took part in the conflict,

and

realised that they too were making the same sacrifices
as the the European troops.
crises'

Even more basically,

both

created focal points around which and against

w hich the numerous Af ric an activists could unite.
The invasion of Aby ss in ia

in October of 1935

resulted in countless committees and organisations to
prot est and force the League of Nations to take some
action.
states,

As Abyssinia was one of the few black soverign
the emotional response was i n t e n s e . ^

The declarat io n of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 was
another mi les tone
ism.

in creating an atmosphere of n a t i o n a l 

The statement that "all people had a right to

choose the form of gove rnm ent under which they w ou ld
live and determine their pol itical destiny" was
rein for ced by Clement Attlee,
who

then Churc hil l's deputy,

in response to a WASU demand for clarification,

re plied that the Charter was app licable to all and would
be denied to no one.

The fact the Churchill

subsequently

cat egor is ed the statement as applying only to Europe
only fanned the flames and the det er mi nati on of the
voices calling for Af r i c a n independence.
In 1943,

George Padmore,

a leadi ng Pan-African

wri ter from the West Indies and Na nc y Cunnard wrote an
article entitle d "The White Man's Duty: An Anal ysi s of
the Colonial Question in Light of the Atlanti c Charter".
The article illustrates the growing frustration and
gat he rin g radical desire for freedom.
p r o p os ed Ch arter for the Colonies;

The article's

called for economic,

social and political equ ality in Africa,

par tic ularly in

South Africa, whose systematic oppression was the
greate st source of anger.

For the British Wes t Indies,

internal self -g ove rnme nt was to be granted immediately.
It wo u l d only be a mat te r of time before the same dem and
was

issued for A f r i c a . ^
This did happen,

in M an c h e s t e r in 1945, at the

second official Pan -Afri ca n Conference.

Pan -Afr ic an Congress:

Phase III

Prior to this in 1944,
was launched,

the Pan-Af ri ca n Federat ion

in Manchester, which was to incorporate

ma n y of the existing Pa n-A frican organisations,
while each of them was to remain autonomous,

and

each was

required to adhere to the basic framework of the P.A.F.,
which meant each was to promote unity and cooperation
among peo ple wo rk in g towards the freedom and indepen
dence of Africa.

It was the P.A.F. whose voice led the

ever inc reasing pre ss ure on the Attlee government to
live up to its promises on the colonial issue and it was
the P.A.F. wh i c h underto ok the organi sing for the
Manche st er Co nf erence inviting the aging W. E. B. DuBois
to be the Chairman.

15

The Man c h e s t e r Confer ence was probabl y the most
effective and influential
Africanism.

in the de ve lo pmen t of Pan-

It also mar ked a branch point.

former meetings,

In the

never before had all of Africa and the

Caribbean been represented.

There were student

organisations as well as Trade Union representatives,
and other officially accredited delegates rep resenting
nati ona list movements
As with WASU,

in the colonies.

there we re individuals brought into

contact wit h each other who were to become important to

h is tory themselves.
gates

The effect of having official d e l e 

instead of ha ving people attend in a private

ca pa city mean t that dec isions and proposals now had
effects beyond those who were present.
At the end of the conference the changing tone on
self rule and independence was obvious:

immediate

independence for Br iti sh and French We st Af ri can
colonies,

the Br iti sh Sudan,

colonies, was demanded.

and French No rth Afric an

Economic,

social and political

reform were urged for East and Central Africa,

the Wes t

Indies and British Guyana.
Sol idarity was declare d wit h Egypt's demands that
British

forces be removed from her soil as well as with

the struggle against op pr ess ion in South Af ri ca and the
United States.
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As if that was not enough,

the

dec la ra tion went on to call upon the workers and farmers
of the colonies to unite and organise to fight im p er ia l
ism,

the use of strikes and boycotts was encouraged,

following the example of India in her quest for in depen
dence.

There was a new m il i t a n c y in the movement,

a

radical step forward not only in met hod but also in
scope,

and application.

The Pan- Af rican idea was develo pi ng into a strong
substantive mo ve me nt for nationalism,

with mass support

back in the colonies geared towards achieving i n dep en 
dence.

The self -d et ermi nat ion aspect of Pan -Af ri ca ni sm

b eg an to become par amount and receive more attention,
the goal of solidarity followed close behind.

Later it

wo u l d lag farther and farther behind.
The period following the conference,

can be

de s cr ib ed as one in wh ich attempts were made to try and
organise and control the growing swell of nati ona list
sentiment.

The ap plication of these militan t strategies,

including p a r t ici pa ti ng in strikes and boycotts

led to

increasing contact and coope rat ion between the PanAfrican is ts

in London and the nat io nli st mov ements in

the various colonies.
There were numerous publications,

articles and

books geared towards this end, p re sen ting ideas and
opinions to the increasingly interested populations,

and

it was through these p ub li cati ons that reputations were
made.

Those who achieved such renown as thinkers,

organi ser s and effective communic ato rs

found themselves

being invited to return to their respective colonies and
take a direct hand in the struggle for independence.
Au g u s t of 1947,

for example,

In

Kwame Nkru mah left for the

Gol d Coast to become the secretary for the United Gold
Coast Convention,

the leading nat io nli st mov em en t in

that c o l o n y . ^
The inc reasing pr ed omi nan ce of the issue of na t i o n 
alism and independence was
A fr ic a itself.

facilitated by events in

In 1952,

a mil it ar y coup replaced the puppet

m o n a r c h y of King Farouk with the nationalist Gamel
Nas se r at its head,

supported by the Egyptian army.

That same year saw the outbreak of the "Mau Mau" u p r i s 
ings in Kenya,

long thought safely and firmly secured in

the British Empire.
revolution began.

Two years later the Algerian
There was a growing atmosphere of'

tension and .e x p e c t a t i o n .
In 1955 the Bandung Conference was held in Cairo,
w hich r e- af firmed As ian solidarity with Africa's quest
for freedom,

sending out another ripple into the already

troubled waters.

18

Pan A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s :♦ Phase IV
The last phase in the emergence of African Unity
and the attainment of the goals of A f ri ca n nationalism
was ushered in by the 1958 Conference of Independent
A f r i c a n States, wh i c h was held in the newly independent
nation of Ghana.

N k r u m a h 1s previous participation wi th

the Pan -A fr i ca n organisations
and lasting impression on him,
pursuit of A f ri c an Unity.

in London had made a deep
and led to his un flagging

On the eve of independence,

he told the wo rld press that "Ghana's independence is
m e an in gl es s unless

it is linked with the total libera

tion of the continent of Africa."
N k ru ma h was now in the uniquely powerful position

21.

of being one of the leading theorists of Pan-African
thought,

and the Head of State of a nation.

His close

links with with DuBois and Padmore led to his inviting
them to continue their work in Ghana,

thus mak in g it the

n ew center for the quest for Af rican Unity and occasionally even for A f r ic an nationalism.
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Though the conference was attended by only eight
nations;

Egypt,

Tunisia, Morrocco,

Ethiopia and Ghana,

Libya,

Sudan,

Liberia,

the impact of the conference was

inspirational to nationalist movements all over Africa.
The conference was also significant because it raised
the first hints of the tension between the drive for
Af ri ca n Unity and the drive to consolidate independent
nations.
Among the ma ny resolutions and proposals called
for,

the delegates resolved to preserve unity of purpose

and action in foreign policy.

They stressed the need to

avoid taking any individual action that might endanger
their freedom of interest, while acknowledging the need
for better communications and trade bet we en Af rican
states and the need to invest their resources
ing this.

in a ch ie v

They agreed to do this so far as it did not

compromise the independence,
integrity of the states.

sovreignty and territorial
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The African nationlist had switched roles,

from

being leaders of movements opposing the administration

22.

to actually being the administration.

Their r e s p o n s i b i 

lities changed from trying to undermine and change the
existing structure and system of government,
trying to create and preserve a new order.
before,

to now
Whereas

they could suggest radical ideas and solutions

as one set of intellectuals to another,

they now had too

m u c h to lose and w it h independence achieved,

little to

gain.
Unity was a tool to be utilized towards the freedom
of the wh ole continent.

Beyond that it was to be a step

towards asserting A f ri ca n influence on international
affairs.

Of course there were other reasons

for s o li d

arity and in these, A f ri ca n unity does not differ from
other supranational or ga nisations such as the United
t

Nations or the O r g a ni s at io n of A me rican States or even
the International Mo n e t a r y Fund and the W orld Bank.
of these bodies in one way or another,

All

attempt to foster

p e a c e > economic dev el op me nt and cooperation.

The area

where the concept of A f r i c a n Unity goes farther is that
its theory holds the ideal of a new political structure.
In place of a group of separate sovereign states,

a

central Union gover nm en t was to oversee a federation
comparable to the United States.
unique and has its parallel
Market,

This also was not

in the European Common

and the talk of a E u r o G o v e r n m e n t .

The years

following the 1958 conference

saw the

m a j o r i t y of the Afr i ca n colonies achieve independence.
M ost of the new nations p ar ticipated in the Pa n-African
m ee ti ng s and organisations,
the interpretation,
Africa.

This,

there were differences

in

fervour and pursuit of a united

combined with the internal differences

bet we en the different nations

led to groupings and blocs

based on re gionalism and common colonial heritage,

the

French speaking nations coming together in their o r g a n i 
sations and the English speaking organisations

in theirs,

with the odd country in each group.
Between 1960 and 1963 the numerous different blocs
and groupings could all be said to represent the basic
split in ideology between the mi li ta nt radical Casablanca
group,

comprising Ghana,

Egypt, Morrocco,

A l g e r i a n freedom movement

Guinea,

the

(GPRA), Libya and Mali,

and

the more conservative governments of French speaking
Africa,

as well as Ethiopia,

vaci ll at ed a lot)
and Tunisia,

Nigeria,

Libera,

Libya

Sierra Leone,

called the Monrov ia group,

their name from respective conferences.
The differences

(which

Somalia,

Togo

both taking
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in ideology between the two major

blocs represented the di vision that would plague the OAU
in years to come and block any pursuit of a real, and
radical concept of A f ri ca n unity.

There were other

issues that would split Afr ic a into different groupings
and it would be an ov er si m plification to say that the

Ca sa blanca group held the common vi ew of African unity.
Their solidarity with each other was expressed in
their activism for gaining independence
Africa,

for the rest of

and a common stand against neo-colonialism.

Nevert he le ss

it was

Union Government,

from this group that the calls for

for a United States of Afr ic a and

central government came,

particularly from Ghana.

From the opposing view came the idea of solidarity
between independent soveriegn states.'
group were the Ivory Coast,

Leading this
72

Nigeria and Togo."'

As the rifts between these' nations worsened,

and

conferences were held ignoring some “and for the purpose
of co n demning others,

Emperor Haile Selassie finally

called for a conference where all wo u l d have a chance to
p resent their views in front of all the African nations,
and an attempt to organise structures promoting African
Unity would be attempted.

Pan A f r i c a n Congress:

Phase V

The Addis Ababa Conference was held from May 2 3-2 5
in 1963.

An un pr ec e de nt ed thirty heads of states met

and agreed to form the Or ga nisation of Afri ca n Unity
w hich w ould be the primary and principal body organising
the relations between Af rican nations themselves and
A f ri ca n relations with the rest of the world.
this point,

Beyond

the theory of Af rican Unity would go no

farther in practice.
The principles and charter of the OAU represent a
co m pr om is in g of the more radical ideas of Afri ca n Unity
in its Pan- Af ri ca n trappings,
necessary:

and perhaps

it was

all supranational bodies represent

compromises of individual national desires,
also compromise in their purposes themselves

they must
so as to

retain their appeal to as many different interest groups
as possible.

With the Addis meeting in particular,

there was incredible pressure to come out of the very
closely observed summit with something to show.

Certain

issues were therefore politely and temporarily forgot
ten,

at the same time the most fervrent proponent of the

radical union of Af r i c a n states, N krumah of Ghana,

had

by this time antagonised and angered too ma ny other
heads of states w it h his self-proclaimed leadership of
A f r i c a n nat io na li s m and Pan-Africanism.

There was

in

effect no single loud voice appealing for a truly united
Africa.

In such an atmosphere,

it is not surprising

that the more conservative ideas of c on sultation and
functional co- o pe ra ti on finally won out.

The newly

acquired status of sovereign nationhood was too precious
to be tampered with,

and was to remain paramount.

Regional groupings based on economic and cultural ties
were allowed,
tolerated.

but competeing regional blocs would not be

The nature of the OAU was decided,

the
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q u e st io n as to w hether it was permanent,

was now

depe nd en t on how mu ch each individual nation w ou l d
tolerate interference.
The OAU does not and can not represent the apex and
c o nc lu si on of the Pan -A fr ic an goal of A f ri ca n Unity.
Not only is there strife and discord in Africa be t we en
m e m be r states,

there is a growing sense of d es po ndancy

and frustration with the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,of the body.
This

is not only limited to the cynicism that most have

towards these supranational bodies,
of the very purpose of the body.
twentieth anniversay in 1983,

it is a que st io ni ng

When it celebrated its

a cynical press stated

that its greatest achievement was that it had survived
at all,

given the numerous crises that had forced

several meetings to be cancelled,

and had seen some

countries refuse to attend.
With the demise of the original

founders of the

body as well as the old guard of men who par ti ci pa te d in
the Pan-Afr ic a n organis at io n in London,

one,has to

w o n d e r w h e th er this t e mporary phase of African unity is
not the final permanent one.

At the same time the

co nt inuing political and economic c r i s e s 1 wh i c h the
A f r i c a n nations have been in since independence has led
to increasing pressures and tensions augmenting the
already uneasy composition of populations w it h i n these
states.

There is therefore a rigid intolerance of
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mo vements desiring to break away from the formal state,
as this represents not only a decrease in power,
authority for the government,
the whole nation as well.

and

but also fosters doubt for

The pro bl e m arises when an

outside opinion favours the rebellions and this has been
a pr ob l em facing the OAU. By championing the right for
all Africans to have the right to self-determination,
the OAU sets itself up in favour of rebel movements,

or

officially unrecognised organisations, which claim,
legitimately,

in some cases that they should not be

ruled by the government of the state that was put in
place in by the colonial power.

The pr oblem of

arbitrary boundaries rises up again to haunt Africa.
Ironically a solution to the p r o bl em is possible by the
idea of federating,

and creating a central government

for all w hi c h would not be questioned.

The nationalist

urge, to m a i n ta in the territorial integrity of the state
however,

stands in the way,

and the O.A.U. has not found

a w a y to deal with the problem.

CHA PTER TWO

The Harvest of Fragm en ta ti on

The period b etween 1958-1963,
m a t i o n on the A fr i c a n continent.
Ghana,

saw a great t r a n sf o r
The independence of

was but the first in a flood of former colonies

to achieve independence.

In most.of the colonies,

former leaders of the various national movements with
their parties

invariably came to head the administration

and the first native governments.
The efforts to consolidate the former colonies
solid nation-states was

into

soon faced with the increasingly

strident call for Af r i c a n Unity.

After all,

the theorie

of liberation had em ph atically stated that a united
A f r i c a n effort involving all of Africa would be the most
successful m et ho d of achieveing national liberation.
the same time,

At

the very theory and essence of the l iber

ation struggle in A f ri ca was integrated with solidarity
and unity among blacks both in Africa and outside the
continent.

The difference now though, was that the

leaders of the liberation struggle had now mo ve d from a
p osition where Pan-A f ri ca ni st theory had been another
w e a p o n aimed at achieveing independence,
was more rhetoric than action,)

(and where it

to the stage where the

theory wa i t e d to be interpreted,
It was

and put into practice.

in this arena that the tensions arose;

over the

interpre ta ti on of A f r ic an unity and Af ri ca n solidarity.
H is torical evidence documents the conflict over inter
pretation,

showing the .splits and eventual cleavages

w h i c h so influenced the formation of the OAU and its
charter.

The history unfolds

itself in the form of

numerous conferences, m ovements and declarations.

The first of these conferences were the two held in
A ccra in 1958.

The first, w hich consisted of the eight

independent A frican nations at that time,
Eithiopia,

Liberia,

and the second,

Libya,

Sudan,

Ghana,

Egypt,

Tunisia and Morocco,

also in 1958 w hich was attended by most

of the political parties and organisations

in Africa,

and was unoffi ci al ly known as the All A f rican Peoples
Congress.

The Co nf erence of Independen-j: Afr ic a n States
Upon achieving independence for Ghana,
Nkrumah,

Kwame

soon showed his committment to Pan Africanism.

He first invited George Padmore to be his advisor on
Af r i c a n affairs.

Padmore,

an eminent writer and

theorist had been deeply involved in many of the
orgnisations which had agitated for independence,

and

wh ile in London, was one of the main organisers of the

P a n - A fric an Congress

in M a n c heste r in 1945.

Accra soon became the center for propaganda and
r ev ol utionary materi al wh ic h spread to many parts of the
continent.

After consulting with the Heads of State of

the independent nations, Nk rumah then convened a c o n f e r 
ence

in Accra.

Wh ile specific resolutions towards

ac hieving a single Af ri ca n government,
Af r i c a n states were not declared,

or a union of

there was a strong

pr es e n t a t i o n of what was defined as

’an African p e r s o n 

ality', which was d escribed in the .following manner;
"We resolve to preserve the unity of purpose
and action in the international affairs which
we have

forged amongst ourselves

historic conference;
wo n independence,
integrity;

in this

to safeguard our hard

sovreignity and territorial

to preserve among ourselves a

fundemental unity of outlook on foreign
policy so that a distinct Af rican Personality
w il l play its part in co-oper at io n with other
peace loving nations to further the cause of
peace „ . 23

The conference also laid the groundwork for the All
A fr i c a Peoples Conference, w hich occured later that
year.

Out of this conference came a more militant

rhetoric on the topic of the liberation of the rest of
Africa,

than had been the case with the preceding

conference.

A t te ndance at the conference bestowed great

status on the various nationlist movements,

throughout

Africa.

The conference also raised the issue of inter

preting exactly what Afri ca n Unity would entail.
Suggestions towards achieving a Union of Afr ic an States
were discussed,

and regional groupings were suggested as

a first phase.

A mo ng the resolutions declared were:

1.

A n en do r sement of Pan- Af ri ca n is m and the
desire

2.

for unity among Afr ic an people.

A decl ar a ti on that the ultimate objective was
the evolution of a Commonwealth of Free
A f r ic an States.

3.

A call to the independent States of Africa to
lead the peoples” of Africa toward the a t ta in 
m ent of this objective.

4.

A n expressed hope that the day w ou l d dawn when
the first loyalty of Af ri c an States w ould be
24
to an A f r ic an Commonwealth.

The language and intent of the resolutions was
d i pl om at ic a ll y vague and general,

yet,

there can be

little doubt that a single Af rican body,

even such a

loose one as a commonwealth was present in the minds of
the participants of the conference.

The conference went

further and en co uraged regional groupings.
The ga thering endorsed the desire in various parts
of Afri ca for regional groupings of states,

and

advocated that such groupings be based on three
principles namely:

1.

Only independent states and countries governed
by Africans

2.

should come together,

The es t ab lishment of groups

and

should not be

p re judiced to the ultimate objective of a
P a n -A fr ic a n Commonwealth.

The Conference also we nt on to denounce the a rt i f i 
cial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers and r ec om 
m e n d e d their abolition or adjustment at an early date.
A pe rmanent Secretariat was

set up to promote u n d e r 

standing and unity and among other things a feeling of
one c ommunity among the people of Africa, wit h the
objective of facillitating the emergence of a United
States of Africa.
It was from, this conference that the seeds of the
Ghana,

Guinea and later Mali, Union first germinated.

One cannot ignore the fact that even though Nkr um ah of
Ghana,

as a radical Pan Africanist,

come to the aid of Guinea,
independence,

would p r o ba bl y have

upon her abrupt attainment of

(which shall be dealt with later),

it was

the conference however that produced the theory and
framework, which enabled the union to come into being on
the 1st of M a y 1559,

in Con a kr y Guinea.

The fact that the U nion was made up of only two
states did not unde rm in e its significance,
its goals and declarations.

or inhibit

The union was seen, by its

m embers as a nucleus of the eventual United States of
Africa,

and the bulk of its document reflected that

orientation.
Ghana and Guinea were already established radical
states vis a vis Pan Africanism,

and this union and the

rhetoric that surrounded its founding only enhanced that
reputation.

Yet at the Sanaquille Conference held in

L iberia that same year,

the participants agreed to the

principles of non-in te rf er en c e in the domestic affiars
of others,

and were also expected to maintain their

individual structure.
were
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The Sanaquille declarations

just the first of ma ny such documents, where

c onserv at iv e formality took preven ta ti ve action against
.the radical Pan- A fr ic an is t elements.

The second All A f r i c a n Peoples Conference, w hi ch
was held in Tunis
A f r i c a n Unity.

in Ja nuary of 1960,

also called for

Its ob jectives included the p romotion of

u n d er st a nd in g and unity among Afr ic an people;
of a feeling of one community,
tion struggle,

development,

accelerating the l i be r a

and mo bi li s i n g support for the struggle

and finally w o r ki ng for the emergence of a united states
, _
.
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of Africa.
In trying to express the

'African Personality'

the

c onference warned against neo-col on i sa ti on and balkanisation w h i c h were to be fought through economic c o o p e r a 
tion among A frican states.

To this end an effort was

made to start an A f r i c a n Trade Union.
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While there was unanimity on most of the resolution
at the conference,

the Trade Union issue caused the

first crack in the facade of unity and concensus.

The

origins of the split came back down to the differences
between the radical and conservative African N a t i o n a 
lists.

The radicals wanted the new All Africa Trade

Union Federation, to be unafiliatedd with any other,

non

African Union including thie Communist International
C onfederation of Free Trade Unions

(ICTFU)

and the

Western oriented World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU).

Their insistence on this position was one which

had appeared earlier at an informal African Trade Union
meeting held in Accra, which had also been geared
towards starting an All African Trade Union.
same time that this conference was being held,
nationalist and cofounder of KANU,

At the
Kenyan

the Kenyan

t

Nationalist Party, Tom Mboya,
the ICTFU in Lagos.

called for a meeting of

This action was not well received

by the radical Ghanaian press, which accused the Lagos
conference of being imperialist,

and detrimental to the

establishment of an African Personality.

The clash was

so severe that a decision could not be agreed upon in
Tunis and it was decided to discuss the subject again at
the conference of All African Trade unions to be held in
Casablanca later than year.
In 1960,

the proponents of continued links with the

ICTFU formed the A f r i c a n Regional Or ga ni s a t i o n of the
ICTFU.

Whe n the A f r i c a n Trade Union Fe deration was set

up in May of 1961 in Casablanca,

members were given ten

m onths w i t h i n w h i c h to disaffiliate themselves
ICTFU,

from the

yet at the founding of the OAU in Addis Ababa in

1963, nothing was agreed upon or put into w r i t i n g about
the Trade Union issue.
The Trade Union issue was

just one of many points

of conflict on wh i ch the leadership of Africa would come
to decisions on,

and decide where they stood vis a vis

i nt erpreting the m ea n i n g of Af rican Unity.

The other

critical event w h i ch finally laid down the lines of
demarcation, was the. Congo incident w h i c h erupted in
1960 .

The Congo Crisis - Hi s torical Background
The roots of the Congo crisis

lay prim ar il y in the

c olonial legacy left behind by eighty years of Belgian
rule.

The mann er in w h i c h the Congo was administered

was more author i ta ri an and dictatorial than either the
English or French systems.
From 1885 to 1908,

the Congo was administered as

the personal p r op er t y of King Leopold of Belgium.

The

B e l gi an cabinet and p ar l ia me nt therefore had nothing to
do w it h it.

During this period,

were destroyed or scattered.

the major tribal powers

World criticism at the

harshness of Leopold's rule soon forced the Belgian
government to take over.
While the excesses of Leopold were stopped,
Belgians,

the

anxious to keep the various tribes weak,

increased the number of chiefs by an incredible amount.
Between 1914 and 1919,
6,095.

the number grew from 3,653 to

The administration ignored traditional rights of

succession and appointed whomever they wished.

The

result not only undermined traditional authority,

but

also laid the ground work for the fractured,
r ival-ridden frame work from which the Congo was to be
built when it attained independence.
C ompounding this shaky structure was the fact that
Belgium devoted negligible time and resources to
development in the Congo.

Education and Health services

and infrastructure were distant seconds in priority
while min in g profits for companies like Societies
Generale, were first and formost in the minds of the
Colonial administration.

Consequently,

the local

colonial administration made no effort to recruit the
indigenous population for positions of responsibility,
where administrative skills could be developed.
As late as 1955,
report,

suggested that Congolese independence could be

fixed for 1985,
daring.

an unofficial but much publicized
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and even that was considered a bit

The development of nationalist movements

was obviously hampered;
abroad for education,
cases.

natives were barred from going

except in a few non-Catholic

The late 1 9 4 0 !s saw the introduction of a system

of civic me ri t cards,

that every Congolese over the age

of 21 could show that he truly aspired to the higher
civilisation,

that of assimilation to Belgian culture

and colonial values.
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The Congolese were finally

granted the right to form political parties in 1959.
Prior to this,

groups which were allowed were “comprised

m os t l y of old boys associations,
clubs.

and non-political

Where there were political organisations,

were ba si ca ll y formed along tribal lines.
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they

“It was

w i t h this b ac kg ro un d that the Congo stumbled into
independence.
The sudden shift in Belgian policy,

regarding

Co ngolese independence is still open to speculation,
there are two theories that stand out.

but

One holds that

the riots in L eo poldville w h i c h led to the police and
the Force Publique k illing forty-nine and wounding
others,

broke the genteel insulation w hi ch had muffled

earlier C ongolese protest,
home in Belgium.

and caused disapproval at

The other,

contends that Brussels

thought that a rapid tranfer of power to inexperienced
m e n and conflicting interests would be the best way of
prolonging the colonial system by forcing the Congolese
to request the return of the Belgians.

Consistent with

this argument is the action taken by the Belgians;
immediate independence was offered.

It took one year

for the different p olitical parties to agree upon a date
for independence.

H owever wh en it was agreed upon,

Belgians went one better,
one year,
1960.

the

and pushed the date ahead by

and granted the Congo independence in June of

The crisis

started almost immediately.

The key factions acting out the drama were
M o u v em e nt National

the

led by Patrice Lumumba, who was

appointed Prime M i n is te r and the A BAKA mo ve me nt led by
J oseph Kasavubu, w h o was appointed President

(and who

only reconciled w it h Lumuum ba at the All A f r i c a n C o n f e r 
ence in A ccra in 19 58) .

Under them was an a d m i n i s t r a 

tion of 9,801 Belgians, most of w h o m left immediately
for Katanga province.

Of the remaining 11,803 Africans,

11,000 were bar el y literate clerks in grade 5, 800 were
in grade 4 and of the rest,
grade.
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none had reached the first

There was literally no one to run the

government.

A dded to this was the seccession of the

copper rich Katanga province,

led by Moise Tshombe on

July 1st and that of South Kasai,

under Albert Kaondji

on August 8th.
In desperation,

L um uumba and Kasavubu asked for

Unit e d Nations peace ke eping forces to try and regain
some stability.

The force was made up mos tl y of troops

from the independent A fr i c a n nations,

some of whom,
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Ghana,

for example had already received direct calls

assistance

from Lumuumba.

w ere Morocco,

for

A mong those that sent troops

Guinea, Mali,

T unisia and Ghana.

The Congo crisis soon had larger implications for
the rest of Africa,

other than just the collapse of a

newly formed state,

if that were not important enough.

Increasing the stakes,

were the visible and perceived

interests of We stern Europe.

What with all the fiery

rhetoric about ne w- c o l o n i a l i s m coming
radical P an - Af ri ca n states

from the more

for the past few months,

fact that the numerous companies

the

stood to benefit, by

-maintaining the existing w o r k i n g relationship they had
w it h Katanga made it an issue of critical importance
towards proj ec ti ng an Af r i c a n personality.

The fact

that B e lg i um supported the Katanga secession,
train T s h o m b e 's new army,
two NATO bases

in Katanga,

and helped

and that it had also set up
were a challenge that p r o t a g 

onists of Afri ca n unity or even A f r ic an nationlism,
could not afford to ignore or respond to.
L umuumba called for a conference in August of 1960,
hop in g to be vindi ca te d and have his cause championed.
A t t en di n g states i n c l u d e d * E i t h i o p i a , Ghana, Libya,
Morocco,

Sudan, Togoland,

Tanganyika,

Tunisia,

and the A l g e ri an P r ovisional government.

the UAR

Here the signs

of the clevage in A f ri ca n unity, w hi c h the Congo crises
w ou ld aggravate,

b egan to emerge.

Firstly,

although Nigera had attended the Addis

A baba conference in 1960 as an independent state
(although not yet independent)
Leopol d vi ll e
time,

she v/as not invited to

for prec is el y that reason.

A t the same

no concrete resolutions were reached either in

c ondeming the UN for its lack of decisive action,
stating full support for Lumuumba.

or

Only Guinea

supported L u m u u m b a 's call for the for the m i l i ta ry
o v e r th ro w of T s h o m b e 's rebel government.
nothing was

In short

suggested and the confusion continued,

causing more damage as the factions m ov ed farther
a p a r t .^ ^
In D ec ember of 1960,
Brazzaville,

a conference was held in

the capital of the French Congo.

In

attendance were the former m embers of French West Africa
and Eq uatorial Africa.
parts,

Like their Leopold vi ll e c o u n t e r 

they came up wi th no suggestions other than that

the Congo should become a loose federation.

What did

emerge from the conference was a moderate pro-French
A f r i c a n bloc known as the Brazzaville group, w hich soon
solidified and took its own position on Pa n-African
A ffairs at later conferences.
As the situation in the Congo continued to
fluctuate,

the po sition of the other African states also

b eg an to become mor e confused.

Lumuumba,

having been

let down by the lack of support from the Leopold

■conference,

turned to the Soviet Union for aid, without

consulting Kasavubu.

The rift between them reopened,

each dismissing' the other,

therby causing yet another

issue on which A fr ic a w o ul d be divided.
k n own to be a federalist,

Kazavubu was

and more acceptable to the

West, while Lumuumba was a believer in a strong central
governent,

and an ardent Pan-Africanist.

The radical

P a n- Af ri c an states though, were still reluctant to
oppose the UN and w o rl d opinion by supporting him.
Efforts were made to force the UN to deal m i l i t ar i ly
w it h the rebels but these met without success.
situation was

The

further complicated by the creation of a

rival student-based g o ve rn m en t led by Colonel Mobutu,
w h i c h pr om p tl y dismi ss ed both Lumuumba and Kasavubu.
E ve ntually Mo b u t u joined up with Kasavubu,
Lumuu mb a isolated.

Prior to this the rest of A fr ic a had

already taken sides;
Guinea, Mali,

the radical C as ablanca bloc,

Egypt and Morocco,

A f t e r his death,
as Head of State,

the

Ghana,

supported Lumuumba.

they w i t h d r e w recognition of Kasavubu
and gave moral support to Lumuumba's

deputy, Anto in e Gizenga.
Liberia,

leaving

Supporting Kasavubu were

Tunisia and the B razzaville group.

a mongst the d ifferent sides however,
one of them being Ghana's

Even

there were rifts;

failure to w it h d r a w her troops

from the UN forces in order to form a joint A f r i c a n High
command.

The actions taken by the hardline Casablanca

states alienated

future independent states, who joined

the Bra zz a vi ll e group in May of 1961,

forming the

M o n ro vi a group.
The Congo crisis provides an interesting case study
wit hi n wh i ch to compare the characteristics *of the
radical and conservative nation,

as well as the so

called middle readers.
The C as ab la nc a group which supported Lumuumba
be li ev ed in a strong central government,' and regarded
fede ra li sm as a way of pe rp et u a t i n g factionalism,e which
they saw as detrimental to A fr i c a n unity.

They were

suspicious of anything wh i ch seemed tainted with n e o 
colonialism,

and saw federalists as playing into -the

hands of the imperialist cause.

President Nasser's

speech at the opening of the Third All A f r ic an People's
C onference in Cairo,

in M a r c h of 1961,

accused

imperialist interests of using the UN to achieve their
ends.

He also went on to criticize Afr ic an nations

for

the mi st ak es they had made and for nojt closing ranks and
u niting as the colonialists had done.
Events in the Congo provided material around which
the Casablanca group solidified into a block,

just as

had been the case for the B r azzaville group.

This

happened at the conference of Heads of States w hich was
h eld in Casablanca in Jan ua ry of 1961.
happened,

the opposing vi e w points

As this

from the other
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nations of A fr ic a also coalesced.
Prime Minis t er of Nigeria,

For example,

the

Abubakar Tafewa Balews,

had

already d ismissed the idea of a Unit ed States of Africa,
saying it w ould only create new problems:

"Nigeria needs

ma ny decades to achieve the level of other countries.
Our most pressing problems are here,

and only here."
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This kind of sentiment was echoed by the Prime Minister
of Sierra Leone,

Sir M il to n Margai, wh o said that upon

attaining independence,

Sierra Leone w ou l d not seek any

close association with other Afr ic a n states*
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,This

third viewp oi nt was championed by the so called Monrovia
Group, wh i c h stated its purpose and its aims as follows:
"To bridge the gulf that had existed in
Afr i ca b e tw ee n w ha t werie called the
ville Powers'

and the

'Brazza

'Casablanca Powers'.

The conveners of the Mon ro vi a Conference,
ve ry mu c h d i sturbed by this artificial and
un en durable division of Afri ca into blocs or
groups set out to arrange a conference of
all Heads of A f r i c a n states,
Malagasy,

including

irrespective of their political

affiliations,

The

'Casablanca Powers'

wh ic h had been invited to Mon ro vi a then
decided to decline the invitation
intensified the rift between them and what
came to be known as the

'Monrovian'

group of

• an states*
4- a34
A f r ic

The resolution adopted at the conference was
concrete evidence of their gradualist, more conservative

ap proach towards interstate relationships.

First,

there

was to be absolute equ al it y and sovreignity of A f r i c a n
states.

Second,

each state had the right to exist and

no state was to annex another.

Third, v o l u n ta ry union

w i t h another state wa s allowed.

Fourth,

non-int er fe re nc e

in the affairs of s i s t e r states,

including h a r b ou ri ng

d is sidents or initiating subversive action was to be
allowed.
O n two key issues, w h i c h the Casab l an ca powers
p r e s s e d for, the reco gn it io n of the A l g e r i a n p ro v isional
g over nm en t and the rep e at ed n uclear tests being
c on d u c t e d b y the F r e n c h in the Sahara,

nothing was said

or done.
In contrast,, the C a sa bl an ca powers,

a d op te d a n

African: Cha rt er w h i c h c a l l e d for a consultative
assembly, w i t h r ep re se nt at i ve s from e very A f r i c a n state,
and w h i c h was to m e e t periodically.
political,

To facilitate this,

economic and cultural committees w e r e to be

set up, as w e l l as a joint H ig h Command.
A final a t te mp t at r e co nc il ia t io n was m a d e at the
Lagos conference in J a n u a r y of 1962.
all,

T here were, after

some points on w h i c h the two sides agreed.

Like

t h e i r C a s a b la nc a c o u n t e r parts, the

M o n r ov i a group soon

c alled for c o o p e r a t i o n in economic,

scientific,

cultural,

fields,

ed uc ational and technical

sugge st ed that committees be set up

and

to facilitate this.
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Still,

the differences and the perc e pt io n of these

differences wer e too large to overcome.

The Lagos

c onference again saw the C a s a b l an ca powers decline to
attend, be ca us e firstly,

they wer e not consulted in

m a k i n g arrangements for the conference,

and therefore

could no t be p r o pe rl y p r ep ar ed w i t h i n the re maining
time.

Secondly,

the failure to invite the A lg er ia n

P ro vi sional Government, was too critical a point to be
overlooked.

The dec is i on not to invite the Algerians,

a ct ua ll y caus e d a rift b e t w e e n the states w h ich atten de d
the conference.

Tunisia, L i by a and the Sudan all

d ec l i n e d to attend at the last minute,

thus m a k i n g the

c on ference one co mp o se d m a i n l y o f stat es south of the.
Sahara.
Th e Lagos conference formalized m a n y o f the
deci si on s m a d e by the M o n r o v i a group.

A general

s ecr et ar ia t was to be set, up as w e l l as a council o f
ministers,

both geared towards w o r k i n g out areas of

cooperation.

The conference pro du c ed a charter w hich

later beca me the c h arter for Inter- A f r i c a n and Ma l a g a s y
States.

The d raft was sent to the various governments,

and, t h e final charter was w r i t t e n three months later.
The C h a r t e r stressed so vr eignty for all A f r i c a n
S tates^ n o n — int er f er en ce by Af r i c a n states in the
internal affairs o f another,

and finally the n o n - a c c e p 

tance o f any supreme leadership.

The Lagos conference produced no diffe re nt a pp ro a
ches, or v ie wpoints on dealing with the rifts w hich were
s plitting Africa.

The m o s t significant a chievement that

it pro du ce d was t ha t the seeds for the Addis Ababa
c onfe re nc e o f 1963 w e r e first laid down and that can
m a i n l y be credited to Emperor Haile Selassie o f Ethiopia
wh o as sumed the role of m e d i a t o r and w h os e remarks at
Lagos c o nt ai ne d an appeal for all the factions to come
together.
"To escape exploitation,

and to

o ve rc om e the p ol it i ca l. de f i c i e n c i e s w h i c h
b eset us, Et h i o p i a urges that w hi le we press
ahead w i t h all u r g e n c y and sp eed in those
economic areas in w h i c h rapid advance can be
achieved, p a r al le l steps w o ul d be si m ul ta n
e ously t a ken to e xplore the p ossibilities of
a ch i e v i n g increased p o litical un ity among
us.

E t h i o p i a is committed to the princi p le

o f political, u nity among A f r i c a n states,
indeed, we b e l i ev e th at w e all are,

and t h a t

w e diff er o n ly in our. assesment of the speed
w i t h w h i c h this most, desirable o f goals can
b e attained.

The task is now to devise the

m e a n s w h e r e b y this basic agreement m a y be
m o s t r a p i d l y a d v a n c e d . . .The furtherance o f
p o l i t i c a L unity this w o u l d be a fundemental
o b j e ct iv e of the O r ga ni sa ti on o f A f r i c a n
35
States."

W h i l e the Em peror regretted the absence of the
r adical states, he w a r n e d "that no A f r i c a n can escape
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his solemn duty of w o r k with' his fellow Africa n s
ca use of this g r ea t continent.

for the

A n d we pledge ourselves

to labour un he s i t a t i n g l y in the discharge of this
o bl i g a t i o n during the days ahead."
It was this ki nd of rhetoric w i t h its apparently
deep felt com m it tm en t to A f r i c a as a whole rather than
any one viewpoint,

that m a d e the E m p e r o r ’s appeal and

efforts at re co nc il i a t i o n successful.

In the same

speech, he continued:
"Ethiopia considers he rself a m e m b e r o f
one group only - the A f r i c a n group

... We

contend acc or di ng l y th at no w i d e r and
unb ri dg ea bl e gap exists between the various
g r o u p i n g s w h i c h have b ee n created.
our? belief,

It is

to th e c on t ra ry tha t a close an d

c a r e f u l an al ys is of the policies adopted b y
the A f r i c a n n a tions today on a w id er range
o f questions emphasize,

not the di fferences

a m o n g the m b u t the large number of views
w h i c h they share in common."
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The m o s t important element of the E m p e r o r ’s speech
wa s of course the lack of support for the r a d i c a l Pan
A f r i c a n policies w h i c h wer e espoused by the C as ablanca
group.,

A t the same time, by upholding increased p o l i t i 

cal unity as the ev en tu al desired goal, he also avoided
siding w i t h th e co ns er v at iv e M o nr ov ia group.

The

emotional call th a t his speech sent out for
p a r t i c i p a t i o n at the A d d is A ba b a conference pro d uc ed the

d e si re d effect:
attended.

both the M o n r ov ia and Casablanca groups

Howe ve r there was no direc ti on the conference

could take,

and it did not take any, other than the road

o f compromise,

and it was from this process that the

0.A.U.. was founded and its charter was written.

Addis A ba ba M a y 196 3
T he cha rt e r pr od uc ed in Addis Ab ab a made solid the
n ature of compromise needed to secure the support of the
Heads of State p resent at the summit.

Among its

p urposes and principles w er e the following:

A r t i c l e II

1.

The O r g a n i s a t i o n shall h a v e the following purposes:

a)

To promote unity and solidarity of A frican
states

b)

To coordinate and intensify their co operation
and efforts to achieve a better life for the
peoples o f Africa.

c)

T o defend t h e i r sovreignity,
integrity and i n d e p e n d e n c e .

their territorial

Ar t i c l e III

Principles

1.

The sovreign equal it y of all m e m b e r states?

2.

N o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e in the internal affairs of.a
m e m b e r state?

3^

R espect for the sovreignity and te rritorial
integrity of each memb er state,

and for its

inalienable right to independent existence.

There were a dm it te dl y other pr inciples and goals
de c la re d bu t conce rn i ng A f r i c a n Unity,
m a i n points agreed upon.

The institution was to consist

of an assemb ly of Heads o f States,
t e r s , a general Secretariat,
Mediation,

these were the

a co un ci l of Minis^

and a C om mi ss io n for

C o n c i l l i a t i o n and Arbritration.

All t hese

bod ie s w e r e geared toward coo r di na ti on and h armonizing
political, diplomatic,

economic coo pe ra t io n as w e l l as

in transport.
The nature o f the organis at io n was finalised right
from the start and its scope and authority w e r e clearly
de fined and limited.
as a success..

The conference was itself hail ed

Both the C as ab la n ca and M o n r o v i a groups

w e r e di s ba nd ed and. in their place was a single all
A f r i c a n body.

The m o r e strident demands for un it y made

by the radi ca l C as ab l a n c a group for a single independent
labour union,

an A f r i c a n H i g h Command,

and even for a

single central gove rn me nt were withdrawn,
Ca s b l a n c a powers did join the OAU.

and still the

The nature of their

compromise became obvious.

It is a little harder to

discern the nature of the compromises made by the
M on r o v i a group.

More

significantly,

a close rev ie w of

the speeches made by the various Heads of State reveals
little sign of flexibility and compromise.
Of the thirty-five speeches given,

four of them,

those given by the Heads of State, of Sudan, Liberia,
Congo and Rwanda,

do not deal with the issue of Af rican

unity at all and confine themselves to innocuous d i p l o 
ma tic congeniality.

A d ded to this list of inapplicable

speeches are the speeches of Haile Selassie, w h i c h must
be put in a di fferent category,

and the rebuttal given

by his Prime M i n i st er to certain charges made by .the
President of Somalia.

The Emperor's speeches laid out

the specific details of the OAU,

and did not deal too

much with long range Pan -A fr ic a n policy other than
c ounselling compromise and patience.
"But through all that has been said or
w r i t t e n and done in these years runs a
common theme.

Unity is the accepted goal.

We argue about technique and tactics.
wh en semantics are stripped away,
little argument among us.

But

there is

We are determined

to make a Union of A f r i c a n s ...It is our duty
to rouse the slumbering giant of Africa,

not

to the na ti on a l i s m of Europe's nineteenth
century,

not to regional consciousness,

but
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to the vision of a single African
brotherhood bending its united efforts
toward the achievement of a greater nobler
g o a l ...
We should therefore not be concerned
that complete union is not attained from one
day to the next.
come gradually,

The union we seek can only
as the day-to-day progress

which we achieve carries us slowly but
inexorably along this course.

We have

before us the examples of the U.S.A.
USSR.

and the

We must remember how long these

required to achieve their union.
solid foundation is laid,

When a

if the mason is

able and his materials good,

a strong house

can be built."

The Emperor's speech astutely trod the fine line by
endorsing eventual union,

yet at the same time warning

against hastiness and calling for a gradual development
towards that union.

The Emperor continued:

"Thus a period of transition is inevitable.
Old relations and arrangements for a time
linger.

Regional organisations may fulfill

legitimate functions and needs which cannot
otherwise be satisfied.

But the difference

is in this: that we recognise these circums
tances for what they are,

temporary

expediants designed to serve only until we
have established conditions which will bring
total African unity wit h in our reach."
The Emperor then went on to press for concrete
action in the form of the creation of the OAU,

stating

that the conference could not be adjourned until a
single African Charter was adopted and a single African
organisation created.

The stress then was on having

tangible immediate reshlts to show progress,

even at the

e x p e n s e ’of the direction the body w ould take in the long
term.
The other speeches also fell subject to the
pressure of having to show results at the end of the
summit, nevertheless,

the viewpoints of the different

heads of state did not change.
rushing into immediate unity.

Tunisia warned against
President Leopold Senghor

of Senegal elaborated in great detail,

agencies which

were to be set up in stages to increase cooperation
between A frican states.

He staunchly refused federation

as did his collegues President Ahidjo of Cameroun,
President Youlou of the Congo,
Malagasy, Niger, Dahomey, Chad,
Republic,

Somalia, Mauretania,

and the heads of state of
the Central African
the Ivory Coast, Mali,

tapper Volta, Tanzania and Nigeria.
Of these speeches it is perhaps the speech of
President Ahidjo of Cameroun which strikes the mostinteresting note.

On the topic of African unity,

the

President first warned the gathering to remember the
diversity of the continent:

"But in actual fact how do we appear to
the world?
unite,

In spite of a strained will to

how different we really are!

Differ

ing cultures b eq ueathed by our former
colonial rulers,

each state differing in the

way it obtained its freedom,
its economic structure,

differing in

or in the i n s ti tu 

tional org a ni sa ti on of our nations.
D i ff er in g also in the various

friend

ships we have made wh ic h could not help but
influence our behaviour or our way of
viewing things.
As is norma ll y the case, we have
d iffe re nt approaches to the fundemental
problems of the hour, we have had an im p e r 
fect or incorrect v i s io n of the internal
situation of our neighbours.

We have even

had on occasion misunderstandings.

We have

also been impatient or too eager to help,
37
for right or wrong."

The relevance of President Ahidjo's

speech becomes

m or e apparent wh en one looks back again at the breakdown
of where each state stood on the topic of A fr i c a n unity.
Rwanda,

Sudan,

Li beria and Ethiopia,

and the Congo, malagasy,
A f r i c a n Republic,

Chad,

Tunisia,

N i g e r 1, Dahomey,

Senegal

the Central

Somalia, Mauretania,

the Ivory

Coast, Upper Volta and Mali all voted against any
attempt beyond co operation between sovereign nation
states.

Of these,

independence,

all were French colonies,

with the exception of Tanzania,

prior to
and

Nigeria, which were British and Cameroun which was
German.
Of the states wh ich called

for immediate F ed e ra ti on

or anything more radical than simple cooperation were
Egypt,

Ghana and Uganda,

British,
too,

all of w h ich were formerly

and A lgeria and' Guinea which were French.

interesting similarities are visible,

b oth Al geria and Guinea,

because in

the road to independence

France was far from smooth and congenial.
had to wage a bloody eighteen year war,

Here

from

Alg er ia had

before the

French were finally forced to grant independence.
Guinea,

while not forced to wage a milit ar y struggle

came to sudden independence wi thout any aid or
assistance from her former colonial master.

Wh e n

Charles de Gaulle offered France's colonies the choice
of remaining a federation but with more autonomy,
the choice of being independent,
compete independence.

only Guinea voted for

Wi t h i n weeks,

and even in less

time in m o st cases, France pulled out of Guinea,
to the extent,
telephones.

and

going

some rumors have it, of pulling out

In any case, Guinea was

m u c h so that Ghana came to its aid,

in dire straits,

as has already been

mentioned.
The colonial back gr ou nd of the African states can
not be said to be soley responsible for the decisions
made in Addis Ababa,

so

because there were too many other

forces also at work.

The reality was that despite the

rhetoric of independence, most of Africa was still
heavily dependent on their former colonial masters for
assistance in almost all aspects of their economic and
social development.

One need only remember the example

of Guinea and its bitter break with France.

Still,

among the myriad of factors affecting political outlook,
the colonial heritage can not be ignored,
from this background,

because it is

or rather against this backdrop,

that the leadership of Africa was formed.

It was

against the colonial system that these leaders struggled
and formed their -own personal convictions which later
guided their decision making.

It would therefore be

amiss, were one not to look at the colonial heritage and
its effect on the leadership of independent Africa.

C H APT ER THREE

C ol o n i a l i s m

Eu ro pe an Involvement
European involvement and interest in Afr ic a took a
radical turn in the late 19th century.

Whereas prior to

1884 each power had had its trading interests and small
spheres of influence scattered over Africa.

The

continent had not been divided up yet nor were these
areas considered colonies

i.e. with organised ad minis

trations and formal boundries.
changed all of that,

The 1884 Berlin Treaty

and led to the infamous

'Scramble

for Africa' w h i ch led to the division of these spheres
of influence into p rotectorates and ev entually col38
onies.

The importance of these boundaries

lies in

the fact that these are ba sically the same boundaries
that the emerging A f r i c a n nations came into independence
with.

The pr o b l e m w i t h the boundaries was that they

w er e arbitrary,
own reasons,

created by the colonial powers for their

and that they defined the groupings within

those boundaries,

and thus made up the future citizens

of these nations rather haphazardly.

In most cases the

boundaries split tribal groups between two colonial
powers and in some cases placed some groups completely
in one colony when their whole historical and cultural

o ri en tation was

i'n a ne i ghbouring colony.

In effect the

only uniting factor in these colonies was the presence
of the colonial p o w e r , and the eventual desire to be rid
of him, w h ich be gan the m o v e me n t for self-determination.
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While much was made of the
Europe's ci vi lising mission,

'white man's burden'

or

the driving influence

b ehin d these colonial conquests was t h e ’economic and
poltical competition between the colonising powers.
a result of this,

As

individual colonial policy was never

clearly established, nor did they have a clear direction
b eyond attaining the colony, m a in ta in in g control and
exploiting its wealth.

Thus,

the administration of

these colonies was haph az a rd in its d evelopment and
often c on tr adicting in its outlook and goals.
French Afri c a for example,

at the height of its

power in the 1 9 5 0 's included N o r t h Africa; Algeria,
Tunisia,

and M o r r o c c o .

W es t Africa;
Niger,

Senegal,

Guinea,

In Black Africa it held French

Sudan, Mauretania,

Upper Volta,

the Ivory Coast and Dahomey,

E quatorial Africa;

and French

Gabon, M i dd le Congo, Chad,

Ouba ng ui -C ha ri M ad a g a s c a r and later Cameroun.
East there was French Somaliland,
and Reunion.

and
To the

the Commoro Islands

A look at the map shows the enormous

distances over w hi ch these holdings lay,

and emphasizes

their lack of geographical and cultural similarity.

C om pl et el y ignorant of the difficulties that l a y
a d m i n is t ra ti on of such disparate holdings,

in the

France

c ontinued its campaign of acquiring new colonies.
The French are said to have followed the Direct
System of ruling, with all power and decision making
residing in Paris.

All policy came in the form of

Presi de nt ia l decrees,

pr epared by the minister of

Colonies and his staff.
After

1848, w he n France abolished slavery,

A fr ic an s th eoretically became French citizens,

all
but this

became a reality only in the French West Indies and the
four coastal communes of Senegal where citizens were
allowed to form political parties,
appointed to government posts.

and could be

This was the earliest

possible outlet for native A frican politcal aspirations
In 1914

for example,

Blaise Diagne became the first

black A f r i c a n to be elected to the French Parliament.
The fact that parl ia me n t did not legislate for the
colonies was ignored.

40

The rest of French Africa wasj

ruled under less democratic terms,
governed by separate laws,

and was actually

among them the legitimacy of

forced labour.
The M i n i st ry of Colonies only made slight modif ic a
tions in detail to the proposals sent by the GovernorsGeneral.

Under the m i n is te r was the Conseil Superieur

des Colonies,

to which all colonies could send represen
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tatives,

but wh ich in fact was powerless.

The delegates

were white and represented colonial interests.
On the continent itself,

the Governor was chosen

from among senior officials of a special A f ri ca n corp of
civil servants.

He alone could make laws or correspond

with the minister.

Under hi m came the Secretary General

and the Government Council of high officials and n o m i n a 
ted leaders who acted in an advisory manner only.

Only

Senegal and M a g a s as c ar had assemblies, which also held
no real power.
Under the G ov ernor-General of French West and
Equitorial Afr ic a were the governors of the individual
colonies themselves.

(The long resistance to France in

N or th Africa prohi bi te d the development of a system
w hi ch could 'delegate power.)

Under these lieutenant-

governors were the district officers or administrators.
Hard as the French tried to centralise power and
decision m a ki ng wit h the governor-general,

the distances

from the colonial capitals of Dakar and Brazzaville for
example,

to the small village

of Gabon,

proved too great,

in say Guinea or the coast

thus leaving the mainten an ce

of the empire in the hands of district officers and the
network of village chiefs who were directly under their
control.

It was th*e district officer therefore who was

responsible for administration, police,
buildings,

taxes,

roads,

development of the economy and social pro-

gress.

The rare visit to the bush by a governor was as

remarkable as a trip overseas by the minister of co l o n 
ies .
The British system was little different,

although

it was described as being an Indirect System of Rule.
The cogs in the colonial system were again the district
officers.

The two major differences between the two

systems were,

one,

the governor of the individual

British colony was' equal in power and responsibility to
the governor-general of the French colonial regions,
rather than the lieutanant,

governors.

Despite the

governor's greater theoretical independence from London,
he himself ruled only through basic guidelines and
principles,

leaving the actual conduct of the colony in

the hands of the district officer.

The second and more

significant difference was that the British Indirect
System of rule,
Lugard,

as propounded by its creator, Lord

sought to rule and develop by controlling and

manipu la ti ng existing indigenous institutions, whereas
the French,

like their Belgian and Portugese c o un te r

parts went out of their way 'to destroy native institut
ions and appoint whomever they wished into positions of
authority.

In short the British system sought to m a i n 

tain at least the illusion of continuity and tradition,
while the French did not even bother.
words of Gorden Guggisberg,

Consider the

one time governor of the

Gold Coast.
"I have never concealed my conviction that
it is on the native institutions of this
country - with the exception of giving
certain populous municipal i ti es a voice that the gradual d evelopment of the c on st i 
tution must be founded.

It was at the

preservation of native institutions that I
aimed when devising wh at is the outstanding
feature of the new constitution - the
provincial councils.

These councils are

really the breakwater defending our native
institutions and customs against the disin41
t e g r a t m g waves of W e s t e r n civilisation. "

It is here that the critical difference lies,
becomes applicable to the analysis in this paper:
is in the intent,
administration.

and
that

or intentions that influenced coloni
I limit myse lf to the French and

British approaches because it was their former colonie
that charted the course of Pan-Africanism.
gese,

Belgian,

The P o r t u 

and even the East Af rican holdings of

France emerged to play their roles

later,

due to the

later attainment of i n d e p e n d e n c e .
G u g g i s b e r g 's comments provide an insight into the
intellectual thinking in Britain surrounding the
colonial period.

Like his French counterpart,

the

common man did not give much thought to the colonial
empire,

and when he did,

it was as proud possessor of
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multitudes of exotic lands and peoples,
the glory of the empire.

all adding to

The English government, while

supporting the "civilising mis si o n of colonisation,
t hought to make her Afr ic an natives,
bla.ck skin.
the crown,
governors

Englishmen,

They wanted them to be civilised,
but never Englishmen.

never

who had

loyal to

Thus one can have

like Lugard and Guggisberg of Nigeria and the

Gold Coast,

formulating guidelines and policy .that aimed

at achieving a civilised, w e s te rn oriented democratic
system, while remaining African.
The b ac k g r o u n d around French colonialism,

saw a

French empire made of countless diverse peoples,
u ni te d under a superior French culture.
grand idea of

'assimilation*

all

This was the

w hich thrived through the •

first and second republic, w h e n the empire was just
growing.

It lasted until the early part of the 20th

century, w h e n the rise of the idea of

1association *',

w h ere m e n of different culture were to be left alone,
given good admi ni s tr at io n and some measure of autonomy,
was debated.
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.
Wh ile the idea of association was

never applied to Africa,

it nevertheless joined the

m el t i n g - p o t of ideas and opinions on the nature of
France and her citizens.

It represented a refusal of

a ss imilation and a desire to m a i nt ai n the status quo of
France as the mot he r country civilising her African
children.

One of the effects of such a philosophy would

have far reaching c o n s e q u e n c e s :
"The practical effect of this vague,

patrio

tic and hu ma ni ta r ia n idealism were not
negligible on the colonial servants, whose
task is exalted and on the native elites who
43
tended to think of themselves as French.

The visible effects of the contradiction in French
colonial policy m an i fe st ed themselves

in numerous ways.

The educational system lagged behind that of the British
b ecause of fears of creating an elite.

For example in

the late 1920's there were about 5,000 students a t t e n 
ding Catholic or Prote st an t m ission school

in French

W e s t Africa, while in the British colony of the Gold
Coast alone,

there were over 20,000.
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Inevitably,

the French were forced to realise that more of the
indigenous po pu la t i o n wo uld have to be trained in
order to assist in the growing a dminstration of the
colonies,

and while the mi ss io n e r y element was the large

factor in the Br it is h colonies,

it was the government

w hi ch event ua l ly took charge of the educational system
in French Africa.

It set up schools to train teachers,

doctors, medical assistants,

pharmacists,

administ ra to rs and lawyers.

It was to this group, who

w ere granted higher education,

middle

the so called

that the theories of a republican France,

level

'evolues'

including

assimi la ti on began to take a hold.
"Thus it was under the banner of French

R ev ol utionary ideas wh i c h were still alive
among the teaching professionals,
political movements awakened.

that

The

evolues considered themselves French
A f r i ca ns and demanded French citizenship.
But French offi ci al d om made no effort to
seize the opportunity;

t h e 1 France of a

hundred m i ll io n inhabitants'

was no more.

It was only later that the profound
influence of the colonial period on the
political evolution in French Africa could
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be m e a s u r e d " .

One can trace its effect,

however,

in the growth

and d ev e lo pm en t of indigenous Afr i ca n political m o v e 
ments,

simply by creating the possibilities.

said earlier,

all French Af ri ca ns were theoretically

French citizens.
G o r e e , St.

As was

The Senegalese communities of Dakar,

Louis and Rufisque actually held this

cit i ze ns hi p and its rights and priviledges,

and this

implied that all French Black Africans could one day
achieve the same status.

It was to this end that French

Black Afric a ns devoted their efforts,

to achieving the

rights and priviledges that were being denied to them.
1914

saw Blaise Diagne elected to the French

Parliament,

a position he held until the late 1 9 2 0 's.

He built the Republic Socialist party,
p olitical associations

from the small

formed by liberal evolues,

like

Lamine Gueye of Senegal and Ralaimongo of Madagascar,

who were both teachers.

Ralaomongo

founded the journal

L 1Opinion,

w h ich demanded that Madagascar become a

d e pa rtment

(more closely linked with m e t ro po li ta n

France)

and that her people be given French citizenship.

Guye founded the* Socialist Party, w h i c h was affiliated
with the Socialist party in Paris.
Diagne was responsible

for the legislation of

1915-16 which confirmed French citizenship on the black
natives

in the four communes

in S e n e g a l , and was

critical in achieving^the same rights
F r en ch Black Africa,

for the rest of

in 1946.

.On the French side,

the legislation of 1946, was

influenced in a gr ea t-manner by the end of World War II
and the installation of D e G a u l l e 's Free French a d m i n i s 
tration as the legitimate French government.
war,

During the

the governor of Chad, Felix E b o u e , a black West

Indian was the first to declare for DeGaulle,

and later

rally the other Fre nc h governors to DeGaulles'
in 1940.

jDeGaulle's Provisional government,

standard

feeling the

need to legitimise its power created a Consulative
assembly in 1943,

in w hich French Resistance delegates

sat alongside white delegates
C ommissaire des Colonies,

from the colonies.

Rene Pleven,

The

looked into a new

policy that w ould take into account the Atlantic Charter,
yet at the same time restore France and the union of its
empire.

46

In December of 19 43 he summoned a Mixed

Franco-Malagasy Commission in Tananarive,
conference in Brazzaville,

and later a

which was inaugurated by

DeGaulle himself.
The Brazzaville Conference,

has assumed an historic

place in the history of French Black African political
development,

but for precisely the opposite reasons its

participants could have imagined.

The conference which

consisted of governors and some members of the Consulative Assembly,
Among them,

reached many contradictory decisions.

the extension of gubenatorial powers,

decentralization,

fiscal

consolidation of the powers possessed

by chiefs,, special status for evolues,

and the empl oy 

ment of Africans in the administration.

Politically

France was to remain indivisible.
"The aims of France's civilising mission in
her colonies preclude any thought of
autonomy or any possibility of development
outside the French empire.

Self government

must be rejected - even in the more distant
f u t u r e ."^ ^

Inspite of this,

the conference endorsed the

creation of general councils composed of Europeans and
Africans

from each colony.

In addition,

the colonies

were to progress from administrative decentralization to
political personality.

The conference went on to

suggest that the colonies be represented in the future
Constituent Assembly which would be held in Paris

ev entual ly in 1945.
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On the part of the Africans,

Diagne's path was

followed by many w hose names would later become famous;
H o u p h o u e t - B o i g n y , Modi bo Keita, Leopold Senghor,

Sekou

Toure, Dior H a m a n i , all of w h o m were also deputies,
elected to the French P a r l i a m e n t > and participated in
the C on st ituent A ss e m b l y of 1945, which laid down the
p r e l i m i na ry groundwork for eventual French citizenship
for all of Black French Africa.
though small,

grew.

A f r i c a n deputies,
colleges.

The A f ri ca n minority,

That part ic ul ar assembly had 23

three of w h o m were eleced by white

In the pa rl iamentary assembly,

the Conseil de

la R ep ublique and the A s s e m b l y of the A f r ic an Union,
there were

114 Africans altogether.

They mna na ge d to,

create an intra colonial party the R assamblement
D em oc ra ti qu e A f ri ca in
Senghor,

Keita,

(RDA)

headed by Houphouet,

Sekou Toure and Hamani.

An interesting

point is that while their numbers were few, they held as
m u c h power as. met ro po li ta n deputies;

they represented

the whole of France and thus exerted influence on the
rise and fall of ministers.
after

Each French government

1946 had at least one Afr ic a n minist er or

secretary of state up until the 1960's.
French black Af ri c an political parties and
movem en ts thus evolved under radically different
conditions

from those of their British counterparts.

They fought for rights which were theirs as citizens of
France, while the British colonies,

always subjects but

never citizens of Britain, were determined to achieve
self government and later independence.
French North Africa resembled the British situation
more closely than it did the French.
example,

Morrocco,

for

strongly resisted the French until 1934.

Though late in the development of political parties,
they never lost their determination to achieve indepen
dence once again.
Tunisia's
Tunisians

first political party,

the Young

formed in 1907,.was initially infavour of

French administration,

and only agitated for France to

fulfill her development projects.
founder of the Destour Party,

It was only after the

a few years later and the

idea of creating a new Tunisia, based on traditional
legal and political systems, while rejecting those of
France,
appear.

that Tunisia's true political path began to
It was the Neo-Destour Party which led Tunisia

to independence.
Algeria's indigenous political movements began to
reassert themselves in 1912, when young,

French educated

Muslims founded the party of Young Algerians which
demanded the law of Nature be abolished.
more radical Etoile-Nort-Africane was
al Quadir.

In 1926, the

founded by Ali Abd

The party espoused socialism,

and the

u n i f i c at io n of the M a g h r e b
Tunisia).

Later,

(Egypt, Algeria, Mor ro c co and

in 1929 under Messali H a d j , the party

became more natio na ll y oriented.

This was one of the

few organisations at that time to be openly against the
French.

the ma j o r i t y of the parties,

F ed er at io n des Elus Musulman,

for example the

founded by Ferha t Abbas,

favoured assimilation and equality between Frenc hm en and
Muslims.

The di ff er en t political perspectives

classlines,

followed

the older highly educated Algerians

favouring assimilation wh ile the younger g en eration of
nationalists,

who were not so well educated w a nt ed an

independent M u s l i m Algeria.

Eventually the y ounger

gene ra ti on won out and by 19 34 was already w a gi ng a
bitter civil was w i t h France that would last for nearly
e ig ht ee n years.

The British S ituation
The response to British colonialism,
French,, A fr ic an s

like the

in No r t h Africa, went from strong

support of the colonial m i s s i o n of civilising Afri ca to
polite requests and later strident demands for inde pe n
dence.

The ma i n d if ference lay in the effect of the

large and rela ti v el y w id e s p r e a d system of e ducation
w h i c h the B ritish built and wh ich produced a larger more
capable and ambitious elite class,
French We s t Africa.

then was the case

in
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The 1920's saw the colonies of We st Africa first
b egin to feel the economic *c o mpetition and d i s c r i m i n a 
tion of British rule as the percentage of Africans

in

the g o ve rnment increased slightly while that of the
B r i ti sh nationals doubled.
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d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in the church,

There was also increased
as there too, natives

b e ga n to suffer blocks and impediments in their rise in
the church hi er ar ch y thus provoking Afr ic an mini-sters to
break away from the En glish church.

Inspite of this,

the first political organ is at i on of any s i g n i f i c a n c e ,
the National Congress of British West Africa,

founded by

H erb er t M a c au l e was more influenced by the outbreak of
W or ld War I and its desire to champion the British
cause,

then by any desire for more autonomy.

aim was to
tions

Its stated

'aid in the deve lo pm en t of political inst i tu 

in British We st Afri ca under the Union Jack'.

t

They too w i sh ed to become a do minion of the imperial
country.
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B y the end of the 1920's the Congress was

already suffering attacks bo th externally and
internally.

While they w a n t e d increased representation

on the B ritish colonial councils,

they also wante d a

federal union of self governing territories.
c ontradic ti on s rendered the Congress
The next wave of nationalists,
son of Sierra Leone,

The

impotent.
I.T.D. W allace-John-

J. B. Da nquah of the Gold Coast,

and N. Azikiwe, were all a little less patient in the

manner and the language,

although not really radical in

the scope of their demands.

They started organisations

which soon began to raise more of a fuss for the British
authorities.

In 1938, the Nigerian Youth Movement

issued a charter calling for the complete handover of
government into native h a n d s .
The final wave of British African nationalists
emerged after World War II.

In the Gold Coast, Danquah

founded the United Gold Coast Convention, which began to
agitate for British concessions and eventual self
government.

In 19 47, the UGCC invited Kwame Nkrumah to

be its Secretary,

they thus unknowingly cast the control

of the independence movement into the hands of the ra d i
cals, who demanded independence immediately.
In Nigeria,

the final nationalist wave was fractured

by the division of the colony into three regions which
each held a tribal majority.

In the North,

the Northern

Elements Progressive Union founded by Aminu Kanu,
for control with the Northern Peoples Congress,

fought

founded

by the reigning Emirs of the Muslim caliphates which
were still politically powerful.
In the south, Azikiwe formed the National Council
of Nigeria and the Cameroons in the Eastern region in
19 44, while in the West,
Awolowo,

a Yoruba lawyer, Obafemi

founded the Action Group in 19 50.

Sierra Leone, which had evolved with almost two

seperate colonies,

within the same boundaries;

the first

the W e s t e rn ized creoles and the second the indigenous
natives wh o lived an almost perfe ctly insulated tribal
existence, went two constitu tio ns

in 1947 and 1951.

F i n a l l y the Creole led but Protectorate
Sierra Leone Peoples Party,

(interior)

based

under Sir M i lt on Margai,

man a g e d to create a coalition,

and put effective

pressure on the Br iti sh authorities

in 1953.

Their

demands were for independence.
In the Gambia,
around the capital,

the political mov ements rose up
and from them came the Peoples

P ro gr essive Party unde r Dawda Jawara, wh ic h achieved
internal se lf-gov ern ment in 1963.
East Africa's tr an siti on from colonies to inde pe n
dent countries was co mp licated by the prese nce of white
settlers,

and the radi ca ll y different man ner in which

the colonies were administred.
These factors led to the delays in achieveing
independence,

and the refore reduced their influence and

pa r ti ci pa ti on in the founding of the OAU.
instance became indep en den t in 1963,
Zambia became independent in 1964.

Kenya,

for

and Tan zan ia and
They have therefore

been left out of this rev iew of the colonial backgrounds
wh i c h shaped the m a j o r i t y of Africa's pol itical elite.
This chapter has con centrated on the social and
cultural influence that the colonial perios had on

B ri tish and French Africa.

Colon isa tion represents the

most critical factor affecting the development of the
per c e p t i o n and pe rsp ecti ve of A f ri ca n leadership.

Its

direct results can be seen in the speeches and wr iti ngs
wh i c h will be ex ami ned in the next chapter.
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C H AP TE R FOUR

The Results of the Colonial Experi enc e On Af ric an
Le ad ers hi p

The line connect in g foreign policy and na tio na lis m
can always be fairly well discerned.
sion:

ones

interests,

It is a p r o g r e s 

foreign pol icy is based on ones national
and cond ucted accordingly.

case of the A f rican states,

In the par ticular

the link betwe en their

c ol on ia l-pa st and the n at io nali sm wh i c h they espoused
upon achiev ein g independence,
are their leaders.

and their foreign policy

These were the me n w h o led the

ind ependence mov em en ts and invariably came to power,

and

co ntrolle d mo st aspects of governm ent al dec isio n making.
The connecti on the refore becomes all the more direct and
yet more complicated,

beca use it raises the individual

factor, wh ich is so susceptible to ma ny other influences,
to the center of our attention.
not be denied,

These other forces can

and mu st be ack no wl edge d in the shaping

of personal phi los op hi es and decisions.

Nevertheless,

the individual dan be pla ce d w ithi n his context, which
includes the hist ori cal background,

the interaction of

culture and outside forces whic h me t up wi th in the
individual.
period.

The his to ric al background, was the colonial

In the case of French Africa,

its effect on

political lea dership was profound:
"The formation of a small Frenc hi fie d elite,
even though it could not boast an educatio n
above the level of secondary schools,
pr ovi ded cadres
and afterwards

for the political parties
for the republics.

Their

leaders were mi ndf ul of the inferior status
w hich had mad e them w is h for emancipation,
but at the same time for ide ntification with
the French intellectual elite.

This

fact

along wi th the estab lis hed relations wi th
the French and a long attachment with the
m et r o p o l i t a n economy,
du ra ti on of the

parti all y explains the

'Union F r a n c a i s 1 and the

m ai ntenan ce of close relations with France
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after independence".

Co nsid er this co rre spond en ce

from Blaise

Di agn e to Marcus Garvey,

"We French nations wi sh to remain French,
since France has given us every liberty and
since she has un rese r v e d l y accepted us upon
the same basis as her own Europea n children.
Non e of us aspires to see French Africa
d el ivered e x clusi ve ly to the Afr ican s as is
demanded,

though wi thou t any authority,

the Am e i r c a n negroes,

by

at the head of w h o m

you have placed yourself.
influence of the blacks,

No propaganda,

no

or of the whites

will take from us the pure sentiment that
France alone is capable of working
g en er ou sly for the advancement of the black
,,52
race .

This wa s the initial French reaction to the growing
swell of P an -A fric an is t sentiment.
sentiment,

Diagne's pro-Fren ch

ev en tua lly alien at ed him from his own people,

nevertheless,

the attachment to France woul d continue

and is clear in the speeches of H o u p h o e t - B o i g n y , of the
Ivory Cost, who was the leading spokeman for the
conserv at iv e Pan-A fr ic an ist philosophy.

On France, he

said,
"We would be unfair if we wan ted to deny the
works accompl ish ed by France in Africa.
Internal slave trade was m a ki ng the people
suffer.

The coming of France was looked

forward to w i t h great hope.

France came in

the name of L i b e r t y " .

On the subject of independence,

he spoke ardently

against the idea of absolute independence.

He viewed

the wo rld as be co mi ng more and more organised into
larger po litical and economic units, but for him,

that

larger unit of wh i c h the Ivory Coast was to belong to
would be a French o n e .

"On the mo r r o w of the last war, France
co n c e i v e d a beauti ful and grand design;

to

free and emancipate her former colonies
scattered over the five continents of the
wo r l d and to associate them with her
destiny...

She undertook,

by the very act of

setting up the French Union,
peoples

to lead the

for w h o m she was responsible towards

free dom to admini ster their own affairs
democratically...
dominance...
endures

France renounced

be li ev ing that that which

is based on equality and

brotherhood.

She wants to create a new

commun ity based on friendship and
confidence.
We were warned.

Our response was the

conscienti ous and responsible men of French
Black Africa,

those who have fought

co lo ni sa tion the hard est and are still
fighting col onia li sm in all its forms, want,
while remai ning vigilant to do away with the
para ly zi ng distrust,

to rise above all

feelings of bitterness,

even the most

legitimate and grasp the brot herly hand that
is held out to them.
In We st Afr ic a and Equatorial Africa,
over 60 mi l l i o n Africans...

were divided,

by

the accident of co lo nis ation in the last
ce ntu ry into two groups of diffe ren t c u l 
tures:

En glish and French.

The first group,

English speaking is

moving towards independence w i t h i n the
framework of the commonwealth,

wi th ties

that are more economic than political.
The second is m ovi ng toward selfgo ve rnm en t wi t h i n a federal comm uni ty which
remains to be defined judicially,

but whose

ties wi t h i n the community are of sentimental,
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economic and pol itical in nature."

Leopold Senghor,

the other pivotal leader of French

West A f ri ca echoed similar sentiments,

although there

was the dif ference of S e n g h o r ’s phi lo so phy of
'Negritude'.

His attemp t to form the Mali Fed eration

out of the former French colonies of Wes t Africa,

placed

him slightly farther away from Paris and from Houphouet.
Senghor wis he d for a com munity which wo uld have a strong
Af r i c a n identity.

"We mus t have an A f rican community,

before we, can have a Fra nco-Af ri ca n C o m m u n i t y " .
Senghor's
the

'Negritude'

was dev elo ped as a rej ection of

'a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t r as sumption that A f r ic an culture

was ess en ti al ly inferior to French culture.

The

differences be twe en Senghor and Hou ph ou et were,
therefore,

slight,

in theory but they did have

r e p u r c u s s i o n s , in the po lit ica l activities whic h the two
took part in.

Sengh or was thus the mid dle ground

b e t w e e n Hou ph ou et and their more radical comrade,
Toure of Guinea,

Sekou

for example.

"And yet in the interest of Black
Af r i c a and of France,

our aim must be to

unite, w it hi n the Mali

federation,
1

i

old states of the old A.O.F.
the meantime,

all the

and to sign in

economic and cultural pacts

with the other states,
republic of Guinea.

including the

By doing so, we shall

only be following France's example."

Perhaps the mo st interesting point is the constant
concern over the wel l bein g of France.

"The rec o ns tr uc tion of the old federa 
tion is finally in the interest of the
French Community.
said:

As I have often

the asso cia tion of the

eart hen ware pot and the iron pot is
contr ary to nature.
strength,
weakness.

it causes trouble,
However,

each of the partne rs
as material,
economic.

Based on unequal
engenders

the strength of
is moral as well

poltica l as well as

The Fre nch community will be

solid only to the extent that the
States - I mea n their populations feel that they are m o ra ll y equal
partners and have a real share in the
decisions of the Executive council.
H o w could this be achieved if they came
disunited, while m e t r o p o l i t a n mini ste rs
of the commu nit y always formed a
cohesive bloc?

H o w could this be

ac hie ved if they get the discour agin g
im pression that their progress depends
not on their united organisational
effort,

but rat her on the pleasure of
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m et ro po l i t a n France?"

The w a r m friendly relations betw ee n France and her
former colonies had one exception,
Toure's solitary vote against the

Guinea,

and Sekou

'Loi C a d r e 1.

DeGau lle 's great referendum, where one chose either to
be a part of France or against her,

culminated the

d ev el opm ent of one of Africa 's truly rev olutionary
socialist leaders.

Like his elder comrades,

Ho uphouet

and Senghor,

Toure was a former Fre nch deputy,

elected

to the Fre nc h Parlia men t and also a founding mem be r of
the RDA.

His rise to po lit ica l leadership, was through

the trade unions,

of French Wes t Afr ica w h o m he re p r e 

sented at a conference

in Paris, wher e he was

to the far left of French politics.

introduced

Alo ngs id e his

strong co mmit tme nt to trade unions, was his committment
to Africaness,

w hi ch made him hostile to pressure from

the me t r o p o l i t a n affiliations whic h the French Afric an
trade unions were subject to.

In 1957 he became p r e s i 

dent of the first independent black trade union the
U G T A N , w h i c h plann ed to "unite and organize the workers
of black Africa,
activities

to coordinate their trade union

in the struggle against the colonial regime

and other forms of exploitation."
Sekou T o u r e 1s break wi t h Paris started in 1957 whe n
the RDA was split between supporters of a federal
commu nit y linked to France,

led by Sekou Toure and

Senghor and supporters of individual sovrei gni ty with
each terri tor y linked to France separately and directly,
hel d by Houpho uet Boigny.
aside,

W h e n the issue was shunted

and France later offered autonomy w i t h i n the

Fr e n c h C o m mu ni ty or complete independence,

Sekou Toure

voted for independence and subsequent relations sank to
an extr em el y low point.
a confirmed radical,

Prior to this,

Sekou Toure was

an Africanist, but as the leader of
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an independent Guinea,
of Pan-Africanism,

he became the leading proponent

after Nkrumah.

"Thus the independent states of Africa
were totally justified in the excercise of
their sovreignty,

to concentrate their

interests on the prospects of a free and
united Africa.

They will not under any

pretext ignore the fundemental problem:
of the national
peoples

that

independence of colonized

"who are trying to elude the colonial

powers by more or less fortunate and just
transformation of the,legal ties which those
powers have imposed upon their victims...
The dete rmination of Guinea to see the
realization of unity in the independence of
Africa,

is notably,

development,

as regards the means of

the determination to see Africa

itself partic ipa te in the development of its
own wealth in the primordial interests of
its p o p u l a t i o n s ...Having affirmed during the
referend um organized by France that Guinea
prefers liberty in poverty to opulence in
slavery, we consider it another duty to
declare before the representatives of the
United Nations that,

in the perspectives of

a swift and democratic evolution of Africa,
we,

the national leaders of the republic of

Guinea, would prefer to be the last in a
united Africa,

rather than the first in a

divided Africa.

F r a n c e ’s colonies to the north were also split in
their relationships with France after independence due
to their colonial experience.

In Algeria,

Ferhat Abbas,

who was to be its first president had once said on the
eve of the Algeri an war,
corpses,

"We prefer to be ten million

rather than ten millio n slaves."

He was

replaced by Youssef Ben Khedda, who had been a key
organiser in the independence mov em ent even before it
left the suburbs of the capital,
nationalist,

anti-French.

and was a radical

When he came to power in

1961, the government communique reflected its socialist
outlook,
affairs.

and its neutralist stance,

in international

The same middle ground that the radical

Pan-Africanists, who had supported their cause against
the French, were saying a united Africa would become.
The difference in the political outlook of the Algerians
on one hand and Mot ro cco and Tunisia on the other, was
due to a number of reasons aside from the civil war
whic h left the Algerians and the French bitter with each
other, but at the bottom of everyone of them was the
colonial relationship which aggravated Franco-Algerian
relations.
"Throughout this period,

but especially in

the critical early 1950's, Cairo provided a
sympathetic base for the nationalist of the
Maghreb,

and also gave them a little

material support.

These faced the

Par is-settler in its full rigor.

But the

duality worked in Tunisia and Morrocco
di fferently from in Algeria.

Partly,

this

was by reason of the variable between
se ttler-population sizes:

around 1945 there

were about 250,000 Europeans in Tunisia,
perhaps

300,000 in Morrocco but much more

than a million in Algeria.

Partly the

variable derived from the fact that Tunisia
and Morroc co were recognised as
protectorates, with some evential claim to a
life of their osn, while Algeria north of
the Sahara had long been governed as an
integral segment of France,

and so,

in

practice entirely in the interests of local
..56
Europeans.

Tunisia's growing demands for independence were met
by a France that was already losing a war and clashing
with an increasingly violent radical movement in Algeria
and Morrocco.

When the first signs of similarity began

to appear in Tunisia,

in 1954, when 70,000 French troops

were tied down fighting in the countryside,
began to ,try other methods.

the French

Destour Party leader Habib

Bourgiba was freed from jail and allowed to regain his
influence and control thus preventing the party from
going into a hard line anti-French mentality.
Tunisia was granted independence,
came to power,

When

it was Bourgiba who

and while there were no thoughts of

compromising on independence, his relationship with
France was

far from hostile.

Morroccan foreign policy as an extension of her
colonial experience,
Tunisia.

stands inbetween Algeria and

Like Egypt, M o r r o c c o 1s royal family had ruled
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with the p e r m is si on of Paris since 1912.
Mo h a m m e d V mounte d the throne,
to be

'manageable'.

later,

In 1927,

the French believei ng him

But the regency ended three years

as the young sultan proved himself very able,

intelligent and prof ou n d l y attached to Islam,
open to new ideas.
can nationalism,

Mo ha mm ed V came to symbolise Morroc-

submitting u nwill in gl y to Vic hy rule,

but welc om in g the A me r i c a n forces.
Party,

Istiqual,

although

The Independence

first demand ed complete independence.

M o h a m m e d V soon came to support their cause openly and
was exiled in 1953.

Public outrage however,

and the

d e t er iorat io n of th'e rest of French north Africa,
Paris to neg oti ate wi th the Sultan,
1955 and in 1960,

forced

and he returned in

took direct control of the government.

His com mit tment and position,

on A f r i c a n unity, were

refl ect ed in his hosti ng of the famous Casablanca c o n 
ference,

at wh ic h the radical Casablanca group so l i d i 

fied .
As one mo v e d farther east,

there was Nasser's Egypt

wh ich had become independent in 1952, whe n a milita ry
coup toppl ed King Farouk.
dent on paper since 1942,

Whil e Egypt had been i n depen 
the country had remained as

mu ch a subject of Britain as it had ever been.
this were the und en iable

Added to

facts that the governm ent and

court of Farouk were as corrupt as they w ere seemingly
indiffe ren ce to the economic chaos and loss of national

dignity.

All this combined to make the coup a wave of

purifying nationlism.

Nasser's radical Pan-African

stance solidified with the Suez Canal crisis,

and the

realization that European economic interests still
threatened to try and circumscribe the newly won
i n d e p e n d e n c e 1of Africa and Egypt.

At the same time,

Nasser's efforts at promoting pan-Arab unity fell
through in 1961 wit h the attempted union with Syria,
then later that same year with Yemen.

and

The arena left to

him lay on the Afric an continent.
The last of the African Heads of State to make the
issue of African Unity a prominent one in their foreign
policy was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

His committment and

perspective on Afri can Unity has already been well
documented,
history,

by the mere retelling of Pan-African

of which he is an integral part.

books and speeches on Africa n Unity,
his ideas,

His numerous

all elaborate on

and were presented in a nutshell in a speech

he made in 1960.
"Fellow Africans,

you all know that foreign

dom ination in Africa effectively disi nt eg ra
ted the personal ity of the African people.
For centuries during which colonialism held
sway over our beloved continent,

colonialism

imposed on the mind of Africans the idea
that their own kith and kin in other parts
of Africa were aliens and had little,

if

anything in common with Africans elsewhere.
It was

in the interest of the colonial and

settler rulers to pe rp etu ate the subjection
of use,

the indigenous people,

po li cy not only of

by pursuing a

'divide-and rule',

but

also of artificial territo ria l divisi on of
Africa.

It play ed upon our tribalistic

instincts.

It sowed seeds of dis sen sion in

or der to promote d i s un it y among us.
It is there fore wi t h great pride and
happines s that we note how resurgent Afr ica
is w i t n e s s i n g today w h a t is by no means a
humble beg inn ing of a process of r e-int eg ra 
tion of the Af r i c a n pe r s o n a l i t y and the
forging of closer and stronger

bonds of

unity which are bound to bring

us to our

ul timate goal:

the attainm ent of a Union of

A f ric an States and Re publics which,

to m y

mi n d is the only solution to the problems
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facing A fr ic a today."

The fact that only N k ru mah emerges as a radical
from Brit ish Wes t Africa,

could be seen as a neg at ion of

the thesis of this paper,

but a con clud ing analysis,

will put his radicalism,

and the lack of it in the other

leaders of British W e s t Africa,
perspective,

into their proper

and give hopefull y the whole picture.

Fi nall y there was Em peror Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia, w h o play ed a most crucial

yet enigmatic role

in the formation of the OAU.

is no qu est io n

There

that

it wa s due to his prestig e and posit io n as the leader of
Af ri ca 's oldest independent nation that his voice
carried great weig ht wit h all of Afr ica's other heads of
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state.

Nor can one ignore the diplomacy with which he

managed to bring together the different factions at one
conference.

Perhaps it was precisely because of the

fact that he had to remain accessible to all sides that
prevented him from taking a clear stance on Afr ica n
Unity.

An example of this ambiguity is demonstrated in

his opening address to the Summit where he stated that
eventual Afric an Unity was unquestionable while in the
same speech advocated a gradual journey towards that
goal with no specific timetable.
In the case of the Emperor,

one must remember that

he alone of Africa's leaders had experienced the loss of
authority in his country and had been exiled from 193 6
to 1941.

At the same time the nature of the Ethi opian

government was still as' rigidly traditional as it was
autocratic.

However strong the E m p e r o r ’s commitment to

Af ric an Unity,

it was no doubt tempered by an u n d e r 

standing of the dynamics of power and authority.
Selassie then,

Haile

s,tood at a pivotal role in what was to be

the final step towards African Unity.

But,

one will

never know just how much further the Emperor would have
gone.

CO NC LUS IO N

Co l o n i a l i s m has been used as an expla nat ion for
numerous events,
Heads of States.

per sp ectives and actions of the A f r ic an
Its effects on their nations,

the

d e v e l opme nt of their pol it ical processes, have been
analysed countless times.

At the same, time,

the

n a t i o nali st move me nts of Af r i c a can not be analysed
wi t h o u t reference t o ,P a n - A f r i c a n i s m .

Moder n A f ri ca n

n a t i o n a l i s m evolved out of Pan-Africanism,
theories,

and its

are a founding pillar on which it was built.

It was also Pa n- A f r i c a n i s m that ma na ge d to bridge
twentieth ce ntury intellectual thought and organi sa tion
w i t h the indigenous aspirations of once again regai ning
liberty.

It did this by pr ov id ing leadership; m e n

capable and determin ed to wi n independence for the
people.
The anaylsis therefore tends to overlap at certain
points,

c o lo niali sm and the develo pm ent of nat ion li as m

on the one hand,
the other..

and N a t i o n a l i s m and Pa n- Afri ca ni sm on

The purpose of this paper has been to look

at one aspect of that overlap,

foreign policy

specifically concer nin g A f r i c a n Unity,
line of connection.
experience,

and trace the

The conn ectio n is that the colonial

has been a m aj or

factor in deciding whether

a country was radic all y supportive of A f ri can Unity or
whe th er it was conservative.
Colonialism 's

single uniting factor,

that is the

fact that all these countries had a colonial history,

is

negated by the great dif ference in the effects that
colonis at io n had on the different colonies.
due to the dif ferences
themselves.

However,

This was

in the colonizing countries
a basic and primary factor of

colonisat ion was the diffu si on of the coloniz in g
country.

Alb er t Memi wr ote on the grand task of

'civilising'

Africa:

"This was the justification for

the conquest and ex pl oit ation of colonialism,

and

despite go ve rnm enta l concen tra tion on the aquisitprial
side of colonialism,
values took place,

the diffus ion of cultures and

and its clearest ma nife st at io n is in

the political leadership that led Afr i ca to
i n d e p e n d e n c e ."
The con ne cti on in the case of the French colonies
is quite clear.

The critical factor was not the actual

colonial process but the diffusion of the ideas of
Republic an France,
hundred million'

its desire for an empire of

diverse in background,

nevertheless French.

'a

but all

Thus member s of her colonies were

made French citizens on paper,

though not in practice.

W h e n the nationa lis t mov eme nts bega n to agitate,
their Brit ish Af r i c a n counterparts,

they were not

unlike

fighting for independence,

but for rights which were

theirs but were being denied to them.

The case is

similar to the Civil Rights Movement here in the United
States.

The compromises made by Paris were therefore

undeniable as they were legally correct.
Thus,

the last fifteen years of French rule in

Africa had black Africans representing their colonies

in

the French parliament and different administrations.
French Africa's political elite-were thus left with the
job of fighting for increased representation rather than
fighting for actual independence.
came,

And when independence

the intimacy of the relationship with Paris, was

unchanged.
There were only three exceptions to this rule,
Algeria,

Guinea and Morrocco, who for reasons already

elaborated on came to independence with cooler and less
favorable relations and impressions of France.

Their

other similarity was than they were also all radical
P an -Afric an states.
The British case seems a little less clear, while
all of British Africa was united on the issue of achie 
ving total independence,

only Nkrumah of Ghana emerged

as a proponent of radical Pan-Africanism.

The con ne c

tion therefore appears to be broken, but in fact it is
not.
Sierra Leone and Nigeria came to independence as

unstable a ma lgamatio ns of different tribal groupings.
The unea sy alliance bet we en the We st e r n - e d u c a t e d coastal
tribes and the creoles of the hinterla nd

in Sierra Leone

mirrore d the deep mi s t r u s t betwee n the three regions of
Nigeria.

At the same time it was’ the N P C , controlled by

the Sarduana of Sokoto,
came to power,
Nkrumah,

and Premier Tafewa Balewa, who

not Azikiwe, who had wor ke d alongside

at the M a n c h e s t e r Pa n- African Congre ss

In both countries,
internal,

in 1945.

the co ncentrat ion was therefore

the politics of nat io nl ism superceded the

politics of foreign policy.

Espe cia lly any ideas would

reduce their alrea dy tenuous control of their countries.
In the case of the Gambia, wh i c h is the smallest country
in We s t Africa,

there mus t have been apr ehens io n at the

fate of Togolese Pre si de nt Olympius Sylvaiuus,
overthrown,

who was

by a coup, which was rum oured to be

supported by Nkrumah, w it h w h o m he had clashed.
The ambitiousness of Nkrumah's vis io n was ma tched
only by his intolerance of|imperialism, !and the
'stooges'

of imperialism.

This attitude alienated many

of the leaders of We st A fr ica from him, both French and
English,

who wer e w a r y of a self appointed leader.

In the final analysis,
r a d i ca li sm in one man,
divisions

it was the co nc entrat ion of

and the inheritance of tribal

from the colonial period wh ic h resulted in the

patchy appear ance of radic ali sm in Briti sh West Africa.
On the French side it was the lack of republican eg a l i 
tarianism,

in the colonies of Guinea, Al ger ia and

M o rro cc o whic h fostered that same radicalism.
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